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FRENCH MISSION II

15,465 B

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x Lt [illegible]
x Mlle [illegible]

D

Mon Général

Je tiens à vous remercier tout particulièrement non seulement de nous avoir permis de venir aux U.S.A., mais aussi de nous avoir donné l'occasion de les parcourir.

Je réalise combien grande est notre chance d'avoir pu en compagnie de personnes telles que le Colonel SCHWARTZ et le Lieutenant [illegible] découvrir l'Amérique et constater l'admirable effort américain sur le plan industriel.

Je voudrais vous dire toute l'admiration que nous en avons conçue pour la Nation Américaine.

Le potentiel industriel américain m'a paru tel qu'il impliquait en quelque sorte la nécessité de [illegible] et de développer avec la France [illegible] sur le plan économique [illegible] amitié née dans le combat commun.

Je sais que ce combat nous allons le continuer ensemble dans l'Extrême Orient et que notre amitié en sortira encore renforcée. Cela permettra [illegible] problèmes d'après guerre dans le seul esprit [illegible] possible celui des hommes de bonne volonté qui est le vôtre et le nôtre.

Avec mes remerciements [illegible], je vous prie de croire, Mon Général, à l'assurance de mes sentiments [illegible] respectueux.

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24 August 1945

The Honorable James F. Byrnes

Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

On December [illegible], 1944, Colonel [illegible], Commanding Officer of the OSS Detachment in the European Theater of Operations, acting upon my instructions, recommended to the Commanding General, ETO the award of a [illegible] Service Cross to Colonel André Dewavrin of the French Army. This recommendation was accompanied by [illegible] from American officers having personal knowledge of the acts of courage in direct support of American military operations for which recognition was requested.

Following orders from General Headquarters, Lt. General W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff of [illegible], especially detailed [illegible] this case, after which General Eisenhower approved the award and forwarded the necessary papers to the War Department.

Under the [illegible] to the [illegible] provided that [illegible] grade of Colonel or [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

"On the basis of this information as to the value of Dewavrin's services to the American military effort, it may be that the Department will wish to review its action in bringing about the refusal of the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to him. We are doing grave injustice to Colonel Dewavrin by withholding merited recognition for his services, especially since several of his subordinates have received the award of the Distinguished Service Cross for achievements less outstanding than his."

No further action has, apparently, ever been taken by the Department [illegible] six weeks [illegible] Secretary of [illegible] left with him [illegible] additional [illegible] Mr. [illegible] received any answer from him.

He also [illegible] has received the following [illegible]:

1. French Croix de Guerre with one palm and [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. [illegible]
8. [illegible]

[illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

American Army, is a matter which I believe should be of considerable concern to those charged with the conduct of American-French relations. This is especially true since many of the more than one hundred French agents whom Colonel [illegible] was personally responsible for recruiting on behalf of this Agency, and who were placed behind the German lines prior to the Normandy invasion, where they transmitted invaluable intelligence to the American military command, have been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for their achievements.

For almost [illegible] French intelligence services have [illegible] Office of [illegible] of intelligence [illegible] States Government [illegible] the [illegible] for the [illegible] and the [illegible] in the [illegible] tary operations [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] Colonel [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

at French, British, and American military headquarters that the American Theater Commander had approved this decoration.

Inquiries at the Department of State on the part of the Office of Strategic Services have failed to elicit any information as to the reasons for the unfavorable view which the Department is said to have expressed as to Colonel [illegible] receiving such a decoration. Colonel [illegible] has been advised informally that the file at the [illegible] does not appear to contain a record of the [illegible] or to show that officer in the Department handled the case.

It is respectfully requested that the Secretary of State will have [illegible] his attention [illegible] is [illegible] of Mr. Frederick B. [illegible] the purpose of [illegible] already publicized by the [illegible] be withdrawn, and that the [illegible] should be glad if it [illegible] my staff, concerning [illegible] oral explanation that may be [illegible] consideration.

[illegible]

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[illegible] August [illegible]

The Honorable James F. Byrnes

Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

On [illegible], 194[illegible], [illegible] officer of the OSS [illegible] in the [illegible] operations, [illegible] of the commanding General, [illegible] American officers [illegible] of courage in [illegible] for which recognition was requested.

Following [illegible] General [illegible] Smith, Chief of Staff [illegible] [illegible] after which General Eisenhower [illegible] and forwarded the [illegible] of the [illegible] Department.

Under the [illegible] of the [illegible] of [illegible]

In [illegible] General [illegible]

On [illegible] President [illegible] the Secretary of State [illegible] [illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

"On the basis of this information as to the value of [illegible]'s services to the American military effort, it may be that the Department will wish to review its action in bringing about the refusal of the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to him. We are doing grave injustice to Colonel [illegible] by withholding merited recognition for his services, especially since several of his subordinates have received the award of the Distinguished Service Cross for achievements less outstanding than his."

No further action has apparently ever been taken by the Department [illegible] six weeks ago, Colonel [illegible] Secretary of [illegible] additional data [illegible] Mr. [illegible] undertook to [illegible] but we never received any answer [illegible].

To date, Colonel [illegible] has received the following decorations:

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. [illegible]
8. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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

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at French, British, and American military headquarters that the American Theater Commander had approved this decoration.

Inquiries at the Department of State on the part of the Office of Strategic Services have failed to elicit any information [illegible] for the unfavorable view which the [illegible] is said to have expressed as to Colonel [illegible] informally [illegible]. Colonel Bruce [illegible] that the file of the Department [illegible] him a record of the [illegible] by the Department [illegible].

It is [illegible] the Secretary of State will have the [illegible] his attention [illegible] of Mr. Frederick [illegible] the purpose of [illegible] be withdrawn, and the [illegible]. I should be glad if it [illegible] a member of my staff, [illegible] to give any [illegible] explanations that may be [illegible] to such consideration.

[illegible]
[illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

French Republic

Presidency of the Provisional Government

General Administration of Study and Research

Paris, 11 April 1948

[illegible] [illegible]

From the Director General of Study and Research

To General [illegible]

You asked me to give you [illegible] which lead to the creation of the [illegible]

Actually, this myth [illegible] namely, the "[illegible]"

[illegible]

In [illegible], an aviator by the [illegible] and [illegible] himself [illegible]

In [illegible] all [illegible]

In the [illegible] of this [illegible] Dufour's [illegible]

[illegible]

In the [illegible]

[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Dufour did not have the right to wear either the uniform or the decorations he had put on. The fact that he moved freely [illegible] in Versailles and in a prison for political internees indicates that he had powerful protection.

Supported by the occupation authorities who were kept informed of all the activities of the Vichy Government, the latter was the only authority needed [illegible] Dufour's activities. We were unable to uphold this [illegible] against him since we had only one testimony on this [illegible]. [illegible] we were unable to obtain additional testimony.

Dufour was therefore [illegible] to the Canberry prison on the sole charge of impersonating an officer and wearing decorations illegally.

He succeeded in escaping [illegible] prison and [illegible] charge by certain Allied [illegible] who furnished him with the [illegible] start a legal action in which [illegible] and Colonel Passy [illegible], as well as [illegible] the B.C.R.A. and other services [illegible] never even seen Dufour and [illegible].

You know the attitude [illegible] strength of the agreement [illegible] which the former [illegible] very affairs by French [illegible] that Dufour passed through [illegible] in the Fighting French [illegible].

Foreign influence [illegible] military action [illegible] forced to yield to a [illegible] signed by Mr. [illegible] brought to court Dufour [illegible] over the attempt.

[illegible]

One day [illegible] arranged through [illegible] [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

some doubts about him and asked us to interrogate him with particular care.

These same British authorities had kept Mansel at the Patriotic School without learning anything. It is thanks to one of Mansel's comrades at the Patriotic School that we were able to break him down. This comrade had advised us to ask Mansel to take off his shirt; stripped, he revealed two magnificent [illegible] tattooed on his arms.

When he realized that he had been unmasked, he admitted that he was an officer of the German S.R. He hanged himself in his cell, as confirmed by the coroner's certificate, copy of which is attached.

This is the background of the "Duke Street Murders".

There is one thing more: the political charges against Colonel Dewavrin. It has been claimed that he is a Cagoulard and was Deloncle's secretary.

A simple chronological study of the facts shows the inanity of these accusations.

The fact is that the Cagoulard conspiracy flourished between 1937 and 1938.

In [illegible], Colonel Dewavrin was [illegible] years old. He was a student at the Ecole Polytechnique (Polytechnical School). After he graduated from this school he took courses at the School of Engineering for one year, and was then sent to the [illegible] garrison as a Lieutenant in the Engineer Corps.

In [illegible] he was appointed professor at the St. Cyr Military School.

It is useless to add that he never met Deloncle.

I appreciate the fact that you have [illegible] with a very frank explanation [illegible] common sense and the existing [illegible] the relations between our two countries.

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REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

Liberte - Egalite - Fraternite

PRESIDENCE
du
GOUVERNEMENT PROVISOIRE

DIRECTION GENERALE
des
ETUDES ET RECHERCHES

Paris, le 19 Avril 1945

Ref a rappeler 201 / 885 / MLM - AM

Le Directeur Général
des Etudes et Recherches

a

Monsieur le Général DONOVAN

Vous avez bien voulu me demander de vous établir un résumé succint sur les événements qui ont donné naissance à la légende des "Duke Street murders".

En fait cette légende est née de deux affaires dites respectivement : "Affaire DUFOUR" et "Affaire MANUEL".

Affaire DUFOUR -

Un aviateur du nom de DUFOUR, après avoir traversé l'ESPAGNE, a rejoint en 1942 les Forces Françaises Combattantes à LONDRES.

Comme tout volontaire [illegible] Forces, il a été l'objet d'un [illegible] de contre-espionnage.

Au cours de [illegible] fut rapidement que [illegible] [illegible] dont s'agrandit la [illegible] [illegible] évident à la réalité.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Il y avait donc la port illegal de galons et de decorations, faute grave qui ressortit au Tribunal Militaire.

Au cours de cet interrogatoire un soupcon plus serieux est ne, du fait que des temoignages anterieurs nous avaient signale DUFOUR a MARSEILLE en uniforme d'officier, arborant les memes decorations que celles avec lesquelles il avait rejoint LONDRES, et circulant librement au Fort St. JEAN dans lequel etaient detenus, comme vous le savez, un certain nombre de ressortissants britanniques et francais.

Personne en FRANCE ne pouvait ignorer que DUFOUR n'avait droit ni aux galons, ni aux decorations qu'il arborait. Le fait qu'il circulait librement a MARSEILLE et dans une prison de detenus politiques impliquait qu'il etait couvert par une autorite puissante.

Le Gouvernement de VICHY, partant les autorites d'occupation, au courant de toutes les activites de ce gouvernement, avait seul l'autorite necessaire pour couvrir les agissements de DUFOUR. Nous n'avons pu retenir contre lui cette grave accusation, n'ayant qu'un seul temoignage dans ce sens. Pour des raisons evidentes, il ne nous a pas ete possible d'en recueillir de complementaires.

DUFOUR a donc ete transfere a la prison de CAMBERLEY, sous la seule inculpation de port illegal d'uniforme et de decorations.

Il est parvenu a s'evader de cette prison, a ete pris en charge par certaines autorites [illegible] non seulement [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] pour intenter un proces [illegible] le General de GAULLE, le Colonel [illegible] VRIN et un certain nombre d'officiers [illegible] tres nombreux dont [illegible] et [illegible] tout de son affaire.

[illegible]
General de [illegible]
Mr. CHURCHILL [illegible]
[illegible]

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Des influences étrangères ont voulu se servir du DUFOUR pour transformer ce proces purement militaire en un proces politique. Le Général de GAULLE a refusé de ceder a une manoeuvre en contradiction formelle avec les engagements pris par Mr. CHURCHILL. Quelques jours avant le proces, DUFOUR, écoutant la voix de la raison a renoncé a sa plainte.

Affaire MANUEL -

Un volontaire ralliant les Forces Françaises Combattantes, ayant passé par l'Espagne, nous a été remis un jour par Patriotic School. Les autorités britanniques ont attiré notre attention sur le fait qu'elles avaient quelques doutes à son égard, et nous ont demandé de l'interroger avec une attention toute particulière.

Ces mêmes autorités britanniques avaient gardé plusieurs semaines MANUEL a Patriotic School sans pouvoir rien en obtenir. C'est grâce a l'un de ses camarades de Patriotic School que nous avons pû confondre MANUEL. Ce camarade nous a en effet conseillé de demander a MANUEL d'enlever sa chemise, ce qui nous a permis de trouver deux magnifiques swastikas tatouées sur ses bras.

Se voyant découvert, MANUEL a avoué être un officier du S.R. allemand. Il s'est pendu dans sa cellule, comme le confirme le certificat du coroner dont je vous prie de trouver ci-apres copie. (voir annexe).

Voila quoi se ramenent les "Duke Street murders".

Il reste encore une chose : les accusations politiques contre le Colonel DEWAVRIN. Celui-ci serait un empoisonneur et aurait été secretaire de DELONCLE.

Le simple étude chronologique des faits montre l'inanité de ces accusations.

En effet, le complot de la cagoule se place dans les années 1936/38.

En 1938, le Colonel DEWAVRIN avait 31 ans.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Il était élève a l'Ecole Polytechnique. A sa sortie de l'Ecole il a suivi pendant un an les cours de l'école du Génie puis comme Lieutenant de Génie il fut envoyé en garnison a GRENOBLE.

En 1938, il a été nommé professeur a l'Ecole Militaire de ST. CYR.

Inutile que j'ajoute qu'il n'a jamais rencontré DELONCLE.

Je vous remercie de m'avoir permis, par une explication très franche, de preciser mon point de vue et de détruire une légende qui, malgré le bon sens et l'évidence, continue à entacher les rapports entre nos deux pays.

signature

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COPY

A N N E X E

(Armes britanniques)

Coroner for
Northern District of
County of London

St. Pancras Coroner's
Court
Camley Street,
N.W.1

The Coroners Society
Founded 1846
W. B. Purchase, M. C.
Hon. Sec.

Telephone : Euston 1891 - 1608
Victoria 0815
(Westminster Coroner's Court)

3rd April 1945

CERTIFICATE OF THE HOLDING OF AN INQUEST

On 13th. January 1943, and by adjournment thereafter on 2nd. February 1943, I held an inquest upon the body of Paul [illegible] at Westminster Coroner's Court, Horseferry Road, S.W.1

On 13th. January 1943, I made an order under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, S.6. directing that no disclosure of the fact of the inquest or of the evidence in the matter should be made.

On 2nd. February 1943, the following verdict was returned :-

"Paul [illegible] died at Wigmore House, Duke Street, on 9th. January 1943, and the cause of his death was asphyxia due to hanging himself by means of certain pieces of fabric taken from his clothing and suspended from a point in the cell at Wigmore House in which he was then being confined, and I do further say that Paul [illegible] did kill himself."

Such a verdict is one of felo de se.

(signed) W.B. Purchase

(Coroner)

H. M. Coroner
Northern District
County of London.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

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[illegible] May 194[illegible]

The Honorable Robert Patterson
Under Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Patterson:

In accordance with your request I am enclosing herewith a copy of the memorandum concerning Colonel [illegible] General Donovan [illegible] of 4 April 194[illegible] to the President and to the Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

[illegible]
Acting Director

Inclosure

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

CONFIDENTIAL

French Mission

16 May 1945

X FBI

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Sherman Kent

From: The Director

Thank you for your memo on [illegible]. You are right. I am having sent to you separately a memo prepared by the French and you can make such use of it as you think best. A copy of this I have sent to the State Department.

As you know, your suggestion about the Japanese has gone overseas.

W. J. D.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Major General William J. Donovan

San Francisco, California
DATE: 10 May 1945

FROM: Sherman Kent

SUBJECT: Colonel André de Wavrin

Last evening, while I was driving Mr. Willard and Mr. Walner to their hotel, the subject of Colonel André de Wavrin came up. The remarks of Mr. Walner are perhaps worth calling to your attention.

Mr. Walner, I believe, served at Vichy with Mr. Freeman Matthews and now occupies some position on French affairs in the Department of State. I am not sure that he is not on the so-called French desk. Walner began by referring in a derogatory way to De Wavrin's youth in the Cagoulard. He used some fairly rough words, such as Fascist, [illegible], roughneck, etc. He went on to affirm even stronger things, such as murder and brutal strongarm [illegible] in connection with his activities in London and Algiers during the war. I said that I wanted it clearly understood that my curiosity about these allegations could not in any sense be construed as a defense of De Wavrin, but that I had been curious in the past and continued to be curious as to where Mr. Walner got his evidence. [illegible] that I had any special knowledge of De Wavrin, he [illegible] to neglect my question and [illegible] to reinforce his own position by [illegible] his previous remarks. I [illegible] for his evidence, saying that I had [illegible] of time trying to [illegible] and [illegible] what the [illegible] [illegible]

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of the evidence and in effect admitted he was speaking from hearsay. He did not say, for example, "I am speaking from hearsay", but his attitude could only be construed as that. There is, of course, some chance that he did have the evidence but did not wish to discuss it with me.

My best guess in the matter is that Walner is thoroughly impregnated with the Matthews interpretation of De Wavrin and that his attitude has no more basis in fact than we have been able to ascribe to Matthews's.

Sherman Kent

Sherman Kent
Chief, Europe-Africa Division

cc: Mr. Richard Stebbins
Chief, Western European Section
(no other copies made)

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6 April 1945

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SECRET

6 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

On my return from China I learned of the FBI and [illegible] charges concerning Colonel [illegible] in Paris. I immediately consulted studies which we had already prepared on this matter, and I attach appropriate excerpts from a report of our Research and Analysis Branch, dated 11 January 1945. This [illegible] that the charges against Colonel Passy were made because of political dissension within resistance organizations. In addition I investigated the facts and sent the following cable to [illegible] in London:

"Can you obtain from British full and complete [illegible] of charges that Passy [illegible] of [illegible] in alleged [illegible] of French [illegible] in the [illegible] offices in London and [illegible] British [illegible] Passy."

I received in reply a [illegible] that the [illegible] on which the [illegible] of the [illegible] seem to have been principally based [illegible] the [illegible] political [illegible] in [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible].

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"Question charges against subject discussed with C. O. of MI-5 personally and with officer in charge investigation. Received categorical denials subject himself had any connection with any black interrogations. These were conducted by another Branch. Latter concerned with local security while subject with intelligence in occupied France. Linking of subject personally with affair was political maneuvering. Incidents did occur and interrogation centre was closed. Other allied nations similarly involved in methods repugnant to continental [illegible] but [illegible] here.

"Discussed reasons for British decoration of subject with C.O. of MI-5 personally who investigated event. Given D.S.O. for value in field where risked life by going ahead of troops to [illegible]. [illegible] decorate him for military value rather than give O.B.E. for domestic services [illegible] award and more fitting [illegible]."

[illegible]

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From my own knowledge the services of this man have been of [illegible] to this country and to our allies. Great Britain has already decorated him twice. I understand that the award to him of the Distinguished Service Medal, although recommended by the Theater Commander, General Eisenhower, was not presented because of a State Department objection. In [illegible] General Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff for [illegible], discussed this matter with me and told me that General Eisenhower decided on the award only after his most careful consideration under the close supervision of General Smith. Because of the debt we owe to [illegible] and in the interest of [illegible], I should like to place in proper focus the accusations submitted to you by the Department of Justice. I believe I can do this by giving you the facts which we have ascertained by a careful [illegible].

Colonel [illegible] is a career officer, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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SECRET

[illegible], and as the executive head directed for four years the FFI's intelligence and sabotage activities in occupied France. Under de Wavrin the BCRA contributed greatly to the success of French resistance, and in April 1944 he was named chief of staff to General Koenig, Commander of the FFI. In addition, it is estimated that the BCRA provided to the British and American armies, through OSS and British channels, 80% of the intelligence on which the Normandy invasion was based. It will be remembered American strategic intelligence had been barred for the greater part of the period. (These figures did not hold true in the invasion of Southern France, where the [illegible] stated: "A rough estimate of the proportion of [illegible] ground intelligence supplied by the three Allied agencies shows that 50% was provided by O.S.S., [35%] by the S.R. [French] and 15% by I.S.L.D. [British](7)."

In August 1944 when General Patton [illegible] Detachment asked the OSS [illegible] the flank of his armored divisions [illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

lines of the Fourth and Sixth Armored Divisions.

After central Brittany had been secured, de Gavrin preceded task force "A" of the Third Army into the Treguir and Lannion areas, incited and stimulated a general uprising of the resistance forces and returned with intelligence on which the successful reduction of those towns was based. At the request of the task force commander he then assumed personal command of an FFI force of 1500 which successfully attacked the town of Paimpol, defended by 2500 Germans.

De Gavrin received the British Military Cross for gallantry in Brittany. He was awarded the British Distinguished Service Order for a mission behind enemy lines in occupied France in February 1943. This mission was for an extended period. Its purpose was the organization of French resistance. De Gavrin's capture would have meant torture and death, yet during this period he rescued a wounded American aviator at great risk of capture. These British awards [illegible] of the statement that [illegible] de Gavrin [illegible].

In [illegible] the [illegible] de Gavrin [illegible] ready to cooperate with Americans [illegible]

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and always of great assistance to us. I invited Colonel de [illegible] to come to this country to meet selected members of my staff for the purpose of carrying through plans for the penetration of Germany. These plans involve the reintroduction into Germany of French workmen, formerly there, who had escaped to France. Clearance for the trip was obtained from the Department of State and G-2.

I do not know on what the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI base their charge that Colonel de [illegible] came to this country to organize a French intelligence service. An open visit by a man clearly identified with French secret intelligence is an unlikely means to establish a clandestine intelligence service, particularly since there are many French officers in this country who, without like complaint, could accomplish the purpose better.

In view of de [illegible]'s record of service to the Allies, it hardly seems necessary to reply to the other charges made by the FBI. I nevertheless feel I should comment on some of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible].

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The charge that de Gaulle appointed de Wavrin head of the French Secret Police in 1940 is inaccurate. Colonel de Wavrin is an intelligence officer and organizer of resistance movements. He has never headed the French secret police. The BCRA did have a counter-espionage branch, which was responsible for the safety of French intelligence agents operating in France and cooperated with the British intelligence services in the detection and investigation of Frenchmen suspected of working for Germany in England.

The accusations as to the methods used by de Wavrin as head of the BCRA are based on three incidents: the Dufour court action reported in the New York Times on 13 September 1943, the [illegible] trial and the trial of [illegible].

The Dufour action named General de Gaulle and his other officers as defendants in addition to de Wavrin. The statements quoted from the complaint [illegible] even if true, [illegible] of enemy agents.

The [illegible] trial [illegible] de Gaulle "Gestapo". [illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

we find no evidence to show that de Wavrin played any important role in his trial.

There is also no evidence presented with respect to the trial of Lt. Carre. He was tried and convicted in [illegible] early in 1943 for his activities with the Vichy Tricolor Legion. The Department of Justice memorandum presents no evidence to show this was through efforts of Colonel de Wavrin's organization. Lt. Carre's demobilization and internment were ordered not by de Wavrin but by Andre Le Troquer, Commissioner for War of the FCNL. Lt. Carre's death at Salerno is cited by the memorandum as "indicative of the probable nature of the trial accorded this Frenchman", but there is no showing as to how the proceedings were illegal under French law. The FBI memorandum also states that Lt. Carre's death in the fighting at Salerno was sufficient to wipe out his previous collaborationist record, but, on the other hand, fails to recognize that on the same basis Colonel de Wavrin's indispensable services to the Allied cause since 1940 should erase the stigma of alleged (and unproved) association with the Cagoule.

The statements about de Wavrin's [illegible] military information are hard to credit. [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

he enjoys the confidence of de Gaulle and has recently been appointed to a new position. The British (despite the statement credited to them that they "informed de Gaulle that they had refrained from seizing de Wavrin only because of the scandal that would follow") have continued to show full confidence in him and to cooperate closely with him in French operations. In view of the awards already made and the continuing intimate professional relationship between de Wavrin and the heads of the British Intelligence Service, it would be interesting to know to whom the term "the British" is meant to refer.

I am also making available to the Department of State information as to the value of de Wavrin's services to the American military effort. On the basis of this information it may be that the Department of State will wish to review its action in bringing about the refusal of the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to him. We are doing everything possible to conceal [illegible] of withholding American recognition for his services, especially since several of his subordinates have received the award of the Distinguished Service Cross for achievements less significant than his.

William J. Donovan
Director

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

[illegible] REPORT NO. 2555

From the known appointments to the higher administrative offices in the new intelligence agency, it appears that the Service de Renseignements et Contre-Espionnage will be directed chiefly by the former BCRA element. The return of Colonel Passy to the intelligence services especially, has caused some misgivings in the more leftist political circles of France where the intelligence services have recently been charged with fomenting civil war and preparing the way for dictatorship. It is of interest, therefore, to determine the possibilities of political action afforded by the organization and personnel of the intelligence services.

1. Resistance Status of the Personnel of the French Intelligence Services.

In the few weeks preceding the reorganization of the services [illegible] the French Intelligence services were subjected to a bitter attack by the [illegible] circles which [illegible] their [illegible] that they were not sufficiently [illegible]. In fact, while the reorganization of the intelligence [illegible] was [illegible] by the [illegible] [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

was not unrelated to the hostile attitude exhibited toward the pre-liberation regime. The distrust which surrounds the French intelligence services is nothing new, however, and has always had something of a partisan tone. In the pre-liberation period and until the Allied recognition of the PGRF as the administrative authority for liberated France, the BCRA and its successor, the [illegible] [illegible], were the object of various charges by generally conservative and [illegible] groups of French refugees located in England and America. Predicated on a professed belief that the Gaullist intelligence services were aiming at the establishment of dictatorship in liberated France, these charges included (1) the use of Gestapo-like methods in questioning French refugees arriving in England, where the BCRA exercised wide [illegible] over French nationals, (2) the manipulation of political [illegible] within France in such a way as to insure the [illegible] [illegible] of de Gaulle, and (3) discrimination in the [illegible] [illegible] of military [illegible] in a manner [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of an [illegible] state. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of their [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] responsible for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

[illegible] regime in Allied circles and of creating a new [illegible] of French authority organized under Giraud. With the liberation of France and the institution of the new Provisional Government at Paris, the conservative [illegible] of the pre-liberation period either rallied to the [illegible] regime or maintained a discreet silence. The American intelligence services, found themselves attacked from a new direction, this time by the Communists and other elements of the [illegible] who had been apparently identified with the failure of the Provisional Government to put into immediate operation the [illegible], economic, and social policies of the more extreme left. Because of the pre-liberation background of the charges of [illegible] coming from conservative groups, but more because of the [illegible] conservative nature of their past record, the intelligence services were to these Leftist groups an excellent target for political propaganda designed to [illegible] what was believed to be the "conservative" [illegible] of the Provisional Government.

2. [illegible]

The [illegible] which [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

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in part to the political complexion of the intelligence personnel. With the exception of Jacques Soustelle, the leading personalities of the intelligence services appear to be of quite conservative background and views. The majority are naturally army and navy officers with the traditional conservative outlook of the French military and not a few, drawn from the former Giraudist services, have a record of former Vichy service. Thus, too, the charge that the intelligence services have a liberal sprinkling of ex-Cagoulards is still repeated, with Passy offered as the classic example. While the charge as applied to Passy may be doubted, it is reasonable to believe that the general accusation has an element of truth. At the time of the 1940 armistice the Cagoule, which had been in the vanguard of French conspiracies in [illegible], is said to have split into three groups. One section, which gathered at Paris, associated itself with collaborationist elements. The largest group, allegedly composed of [illegible], went to unoccupied France where it [illegible] with the [illegible] Marcel [illegible], then Minister of [illegible]. [illegible] members of this group [illegible] later [illegible] and [illegible]. The third [illegible], called [illegible] [illegible].

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

[illegible] sent to London to join the de Gaulle movement. [illegible] it is true that these [illegible] are now associated [illegible] present intelligence service, it can only be assumed [illegible] their political sympathies lie with the more conservative [illegible] groups in France.

The personnel of the French intelligence services, [illegible] with certain outstanding members of the Provisional Government have also been identified with synarchism, which may be defined loosely as a political and economic movement [illegible] the control of the state by an industrial, financial [illegible] elite. Synarchism has been linked with the intelligence services by virtue of the fact that several past [illegible] present members of the [illegible] staff [illegible] Passy, [illegible], and [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] where the [illegible] [illegible] from the [illegible] [illegible] in support of [illegible] in the intelligence services, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

political sympathies are such that they may be expected to give willing support only to a government of moderate left or distinctly conservative views.

In view of these facts, Communist speakers were able to condemn the American Embassy as composed of "[illegible]" and "fifth columnists" who were backing "anti-Communist groups in preparation for the 'final [illegible].'" Even the new [illegible] Minister of Air, [illegible], joined the [illegible], [illegible] the old charge that the [illegible] intelligence services refused assistance to the Communist-controlled [illegible] in the pre-liberation days and adding an accusation that the American Embassy wished to overthrow the Provisional Government and replace its leadership with elements drawn from the [illegible]. While such accusations were [illegible] with the idea of forcing the Provisional Government into a more [illegible] attitude, it is undeniable that there is in the [illegible] an undercurrent of apprehension regarding the political influence of the [illegible] [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

(45)

6 April 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jimmy:

I believe the Secretary of State will be interested in the attached memorandum concerning Colonel de Gaulle. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure

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6 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

On my return from Crimea I learned of the FBI and Attorney General memoranda concerning Colonel André de Wavrin. I immediately consulted studies which we had already prepared on this matter, and I attach appropriate excerpts from a report of our Research and Analysis Branch dated 11 January 1945. This indicates that the charges against Col. Passy were made because of political dissension within resistance organizations. In addition I investigated the facts and sent the following cable to our representative in London:

"Can you obtain from British full and complete appraisement of charges that Passy [de Wavrin] was guilty of participation in alleged torturing of French refugees in his [illegible] offices in London and also reason British deserted Passy?"

I received in reply a message stating that the [illegible] grounds on which the memoranda of the FBI and Attorney General seem to have been principally based resulted from [illegible] within the French [illegible] elements in England. The text of this answer [illegible]:

[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

any Abwehr interrogations. These were conducted by another Branch. Latter concerned with local security while subject with intelligence in occupied Europe. [illegible] of subject primarily with affair via political [illegible]. Indi- [illegible] and interrogation [illegible]. Other Allied [illegible] involved in methods except to [illegible] [illegible].

Discussed reasons for [illegible] of subject with [illegible] personally the [illegible]. Given [illegible] for value in field where [illegible] life by [illegible]. Preferred [illegible] rather than give [illegible] higher [illegible].

[illegible]

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

Commander, General Eisenhower, was not presented because of a State Department objection. In January of this year General Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff for SHAPE, discussed this matter with me and told me that General Eisenhower had decided on the award only after the most careful examination under the close supervision of General Smith. Because of the duty we owe to de [illegible] and in the interests of fairness, I should like to place in proper focus the [illegible] made concerning [illegible] to you by the Department of Justice. I believe I can do this by giving you the facts which we have ascertained by a careful check.

Colonel de [illegible] is a career officer. At present he is head of the Direction des [illegible] de [illegible], the [illegible] which has [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible], intelligence, [illegible] and [illegible] activities. He was formerly [illegible] head of the [illegible] [illegible] the French intelligence [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

British and American armies, through OSS and British channels, 80% of the intelligence on which the Normandy invasion was based. It will be remembered -- American strategic intelligence had been barred for the greater part of this period. (These figures did not hold true in the invasion of southern France, where the [illegible] [illegible] "A rough estimate of the proportion of accepted [illegible] intelligence supplied by the three Allied agencies shows that 50% was provided by [illegible] 25% by the [illegible] [illegible] and 25% by [illegible] British").

In August 1944 (when General Patton through the [illegible] asked the FFI to serve as [illegible] to protect the flank of his armored divisions) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

with French secret intelligence is an unlikely means to establish a clandestine intelligence service, particularly since there are many French officers in this country who, being less conspicuous, could accomplish the purpose better.

In view of de Wavrin's record of service to the [illegible], it hardly seems necessary to reply to the other charges made by the FBI. I nevertheless feel I should comment on some of the apparent deficiencies in the memorandum in order to point out the character of the evidence on which the charges are based.

The charge that de [illegible] [illegible] de Wavrin [illegible] of the French Secret Police in 1940 is [illegible]. Colonel de Wavrin is an intelligence [illegible] [illegible] of resistance operations. He has never [illegible] the local secret police. The [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] branch, which was responsible for the [illegible] of French intelligence against [illegible] in France and [illegible] with the [illegible] intelligence services in the [illegible] and [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

The [illegible].

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

[illegible] to remember that on the same basis Colonel de [illegible] indisputable services to the Allied cause since 1940 should erase the stigma of his alleged (and unproved) connection with the Cagoule.

The statements about de Wavrin's disclosure of military information are hard to credit. No facts are given. He enjoys the confidence of de Gaulle and has recently been appointed to a new position. The British discount the statement credited to them that they informed de Gaulle that they had refrained from arresting de Wavrin only because of the scandal that would follow; they have continued to show full confidence in him and to cooperate closely with him in French operations. In view of the [illegible] made and the continuing intimate and profitable relationship between de Wavrin and the heads of the British Intelligence Service, it would be interesting to learn to whom the term "the British" is meant to refer.

We [illegible] of this information as to the value of de Wavrin's services to the [illegible] [illegible] to say [illegible] the [illegible] will wish to review [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] injustice to Colonel de Wavrin by publication.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

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merited recognition for his services, especially since several of his subordinates have received the award of the Distinguished Service Cross for achievements less outstanding than his.

[redacted]
Director

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

[illegible] FROM [illegible] REPORT NO. [illegible] *

From the known appointments to the higher administrative offices in the new intelligence agency, it appears that the Service de [illegible] et [illegible] will be directed chiefly by the former BCRA element. The return of Colonel [illegible] to the intelligence services especially, has caused some misgivings in the more leftish political circles of France where the intelligence services have recently been charged with [illegible] civil war and preparing the way for dictatorship. It is of interest, therefore, to determine the possibilities of political action afforded by the organization and personnel of the intelligence services.

1. [illegible] Nature of the [illegible] of the French Intelligence Services.

In the few weeks preceding the reorganization of the [illegible] to form the Service de [illegible] et de [illegible], the French intelligence services were subjected to a bitter attack by the extreme leftist political circles [illegible] on the grounds that they were not sufficiently amenable to governmental authority. In fact, while the reorganization of the intelligence system was necessitated by the changed situation of France, the decision to drop the name of the [illegible] and [illegible] of the [illegible]

*[illegible]

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SECRET

the pre-liberation army. The distrust which surrounds the French intelligence services is nothing new, however, and has always had something of a partisan tone. In the pre-liberation period and until the Allied recognition of the PGRF as the administrative authority for liberated France, the BCRA and its successor, the Services Speciaux, were the object of various charges by generally conservative and anti-Gaullist groups of French refugees located in England and America. Predicated on a persistent belief that the Gaullist intelligence services were aiming at the establishment of dictatorship in liberated France, these charges included: (1) the use of Gestapo-like methods in processing French escapees who came to England under the BCRA's exclusive control over French nationals, (2) the manipulation of political Resistance within France in such a way as to ensure the undisputed leadership of de Gaulle, and (3) discrimination in the arming and supplying of military Resistance in a manner calculated to facilitate the foundation of an authoritarian state. While some of these accusations, stripped of their implications of dictatorship, had some basis in fact and were echoed in the Constituent Assembly, they [illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

the new Provisional Government at Paris, the conservative [illegible] of the pre-liberation period either rallied to the new regime or maintained a discreet silence. The Services [illegible], however, found themselves attacked from a new direction, [illegible] of the Communists and other elements of Resistance [illegible] apparently dissatisfied with the failure of the Provisional Government to put into immediate operation the political, economic, and social programs of the more extreme left. [illegible] pre-liberation background of the charges of [illegible] conservative groups, but now because of the [illegible] composition of their personnel, the [illegible] offer to these leftist groups an excellent [illegible] propaganda [illegible] to be the "conservative" [illegible] of the Provisional Government.

4. [illegible] of the [illegible]

The [illegible] which have been levelled against the [illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

[illegible] of the French military and not a few, drawn from the [illegible] services, have a record of former Vichy service. [illegible] the charge that the intelligence services have a [illegible] sprinkling of ex-Cagoulards is still repeated, with [illegible] as the classic example. While the charge as applied to [illegible] may be doubted, it is reasonable to believe [illegible] general assumption has an element of truth. At the [illegible] 1944 [illegible] the Cagoule, which had been in the [illegible] of fascist conspiracies in pre-war France, is said to have split into three groups: the [illegible], which gathered its [illegible] [illegible] with collaborationist elements. The [illegible] group, [illegible] went to [illegible] Europe where it [illegible] under the leadership of [illegible]. Apparently some [illegible] of this group escaped to North Africa after the [illegible] and associated themselves with [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

aimed at the control of the state by an industrial, financial and technocratic elite. Synarchism has been linked with the intelligence services by virtue of the fact that several past and present members of the latter's administrative staff including Passy, Manuel, Constant, Pelabon, and Guillaume, are graduates of the military-engineering college, the Ecole Polytechnique, where the movement is said to have started. As graduation from the Ecole Polytechnique is the sole evidence offered in support of synarchist affiliations in the intelligence services, little importance can be attached to this charge. The accusation, based as it is on the flimsiest evidence, serves only to underline the existing distrust of the services as an organization composed of officials whose political sympathies are such that they may be expected to give willing support only to a government of moderate left or distinctly conservative views.

In view of these facts, Communist speakers were able to analyze the [illegible] as composed of "[illegible]" and "Fifth columnists" [illegible] in preparation for the [illegible] [illegible] minister of Air, Tillon, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Secretaries

SUBJECT:

DATE: 21 February 45

Held for revision

Attached for your signature are two memoranda, one addressed to the President and the other to the Secretary of State, replying to the charges made by the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to Colonel André de Wavrin. These memoranda are based upon material furnished by Mr. Sherman Cooper and Lt. Sawyer of M&A. Colonel Bruce has read the memoranda and made certain helpful suggestions which have been incorporated therein. He felt that it was particularly desirable to include a statement in the last two paragraphs with respect to the pending award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Colonel de Wavrin.

Colonel Bruce also stated his belief that it is important to have our reply delivered to the President before his return from abroad.

Edwin L. Sunderland
Edwin W. Sunderland

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(25)

1 February 1945

The Honorable Joseph C. Grew
Acting Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Grew:

We have returned to the President the documents relating to Colonel de Gaulle which you sent to me with your letter of 29 January 1945. As you know, Colonel de Gaulle has now left the United States for France.

General Donovan, who has returned to this country, may wish to discuss this matter with you or the Secretary.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Special Projects

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1 February 1945

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

In accordance with the President's request, we are returning the attached papers together with a memorandum which we would be pleased to have the President see.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheate
Acting Director

Attachments

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1 February 1945

[redacted] FOR THE PRESIDENT

We are returning herewith the papers on Colonel de Gaulle, in accordance with your request, together with a dossier not which had been forwarded to the Secretary of State. Colonel de Gaulle has now left the United States for France.

General Eisenhower, upon his return to this country, may request the opportunity of discussing this matter with you.

Charles P. Cabell
Acting Director

[redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Secret

January 22, 1945

Dear Mr. Charles:

In accordance with the President's instructions, I am sending you herewith a memorandum addressed to the President on December 18, 1944 by the Attorney General, together with a report by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, concerning Colonel (now General) de Marenches, better known as Colonel Passy.

You will note from the President's memorandum of January 16, 1945, which is also attached, that he desires the return of these papers for his files.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures.

Under Secretary

Charles S. Charles, Esquire
Acting Director
Office of Strategic Services.

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

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

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

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

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

25 November 1944.

Dear General Donovan,

Your letter of 22 November 1944 expressing appreciation for the cooperation of the Foreign Liaison personnel in connection with the recent visit by certain French officers, is appreciated.

Sincerely,

CLAYTON BISSELL
Major General
A.C. of S., G-2

Major General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington
D. C.

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25 November 1944.

Dear General Donovan,

Your letter of 22 November 1944 expressing appreciation for the cooperation of the Foreign Nations personnel in connection with the recent visit by certain French officers, is appreciated.

Sincerely,

[illegible]
Major General
U.S. Army, G-2

Major General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington
D. C.

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French Mission

[illegible] November 1944

Major General Clayton Bissell
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Room [illegible], The Pentagon
Washington [illegible], D. C.

Dear General Bissell:

[illegible] October we approached the Foreign Liaison Office of G-2 with a request for cooperation in arranging an extended plane trip in this country for [illegible] officials who were visiting the United [States and were to be] accompanied by personnel of this agency.

The trip has now been completed, successfully and to our [illegible] satisfaction. I [illegible] very much to [illegible] to you my appreciation of the cooperation we received from the Foreign Liaison Office, and especially of the assistance rendered by Lt. Colonel [illegible] and by [illegible], through whose efforts [illegible] this trip [illegible] possible.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

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[illegible handwritten notations]

November 2[illegible], 1944.

Maj. General Harold L. George,
Commanding General,
Air Transport Command,
Room 1444,
Gravelly Point, Virginia.

Attention: Lt. Col. Ray Ireland.

Dear General George:

Reference is made to my letter of October [illegible], in which a request was made of your Command to make available to us an airplane and crew for transporting eight passengers within the continental limits of the United States.

Now that this flight has been completed in a very satisfactory manner, I should like to take this opportunity to express my personal thanks for your cooperation and assistance.

I do not believe that this letter would be complete without my mentioning the help received from Lt. Col. Ray Ireland and the extraordinary cooperation on the part of Major A. D. [illegible] of the Priorities and Traffic Division.

I should appreciate it if Major Richard F. Palmer and his crew were to be informed of our appreciation of their help.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Col. Atherton Richards

DATE: 20 November 1944

FROM: Sherman Kent

SUBJECT: Notes on Three French Officers, and on their Reactions to their Recent Tour of the United States.

The attached notes include comments received from you, Major Forst, and Lieutenant Helms, with a few of my own.

Attachments

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Notes on Three French Officers, and on Their Reactions to their Recent Tour of the United States

The group consisted of Colonel Andre de Wavrin, Captain Jaques Mansion, and Captain Maurice Raymond. All three were about the same age: 33. The Colonel was the dominating figure. The two captains held him in highest admiration and throughout the trip, in all official matters, held themselves distinctly in the background. In unofficial matters the irrepressible Captain Raymond, by virtue of his outgoing personality, his humor, and intelligence often overshadowed de Wavrin as a person. Raymond had been an old friend and classmate of de Wavrin at the Ecole Polytechnique and had subsequently been an officer in the Vichy garrison at Dakar. After Vichy lost control of French West Africa de Wavrin had Raymond transferred to his staff. The two often joked about how they would have had to fire on each other had they met in the Dakar period. As a regular Raymond had a very different military background and outlook from that of Mansion.

Captain Mansion was a reservist and had joined the de Gaulle group almost as soon as it was founded. He spent 33 months of his four years service as an underground operative in France. He fully understands the life of an irregular--he is the only survivor of 47 who began with him--and in the light of his war experience it is not surprising that he and Raymond should [illegible] incompatibilities.

* * * * *

The comments, such as they are, which follow are mainly those of the Colonel, who as already noted was the dominating figure.

Colonel de Wavrin had an insatiable curiosity about the United States and was indefatigable in his sightseeing. However his reactions could not be called demonstrative. He seems to have made a point of quietly absorbing. On the personal side, throughout the trip he was graciously appreciative of the attention he received, but the relative sparseness of the matters listed below is a fair indication of his reserve on what might be called the professional or official aspects of the trip.

A. Matters dealing with OSS.

a. He expressed a great admiration for OSS and the very capable [illegible] who were working in London. The best liked man is [illegible], followed by Colonel Forgan, Francis Miller, Justin [illegible], Colonel [illegible], [illegible] (he gave the names in this order). [illegible] and [illegible] were not popular, although they were very capable men, "we just do not like to deal with Frenchmen who [illegible] of their nationality".

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2. He expressed a desire for close liaison between his DTSS and OSS personnel in Paris now engaged in overt intelligence work on France. This function is primarily that of R/A. He said he would like R/A staff members to call upon his staff for information, and if they so elected, to submit their political and economic reports for checking. He further bespoke an interest in an arrangement with OSS whereby there would be a free interchange of secret information with his Service. He stated that he [illegible] the establishment of a similar arrangement with his [illegible] in England, and that such an arrangement was in effect.

3. He expressed the hope that he could play host to an OSS group on a tour of France.

B. Interests expressed in problems of the United States.

1. Both in New York and Chicago he posed to banking and industrial groups the question of the United States's ability to get along without foreign trade. In Chicago during the course of the ensuing conversation he spoke of the United States in the analogy of the [illegible] man with the big stick who eventually came to no good end [illegible] of an alliance among a number of small cavemen with small [illegible]. He was interested in what the United States would buy abroad [illegible] exports. Repeatedl, the comment was made that the United [illegible] could not stay out of taking a leading role in international [illegible] the tremendous resources and the dominant forces [illegible] within its boundaries. Many comments were made [illegible] the problem of so educating the American electorate as to be [illegible] of the complications of European affairs.

2. In New York an important bank president told him that France [illegible] not made a practice of sending her outstanding [illegible] men to this country. Colonel de Wavrin appeared to agree [illegible] statement and to express his regret.

3. He expressed a continuing interest in the location of U.S. oil production, and was much impressed by the oil development on [illegible] Hill, Long Beach, California. He also asked what proportion [illegible] oil consumption came from Mexico. $\angle$Apparently he over-[illegible] the imports from Mexico, which in 1943 were but a minor [illegible] of one percent of total U.S. consumption and almost [illegible] by our exports to Mexico.7

4. He was impressed by the tremendous air development and asked [illegible] United States planned to dispose of the large stock of war [illegible] after the war.

5. He was impressed by the efficient quiet way in which factories [illegible] were run. The dispatching operation at [illegible] several different models of truck were assembled on [illegible] line [illegible] a phase of manufacturing he continued to inquire [illegible] plants—Willow Run, Lockheed, Douglas. Also the

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[illegible]liness of the factories and the appearances of the workmen, [illegible]. He had always labored under the impression that [illegible] workman was worked to death doing a very monotonous [illegible] belt. He admitted that all the workmen he had [illegible] looked better fed and healthier than their French counterparts in peace time.

[illegible] As regards the reactions of de Wavrin and Raymond to America, [illegible] to stand out: (a) Both were struck with how [illegible] everything in this country is (even the women to a [illegible] extent). In France they are used to individuality in people [illegible] manufactured articles. As an example of this, de Wavrin cited [illegible] of three French cruisers which came to navy yards in this [illegible] to be refitted. He said that American engineers were amazed [illegible] that in spite of the fact that those three ships were [illegible] ships, the internal construction of each was completely [illegible]. (b) Both men were impressed with the spectacle of [illegible] production, but they were even more struck by American [illegible] genius. In other words, they, as engineers, were highly [illegible] by the vision, planning, and organizational ability of [illegible] management. This ability was amply demonstrated to them by [illegible] the thousands of parts necessary to make an airplane [illegible] at the right place, at the right time, and in the right

[illegible] de Wavrin indicated surprise that the newspapers [illegible] outcome of the [illegible] November election in such a few days [illegible] were known.

[illegible] times on the trip he evinced interest in U.S. [illegible] in the pattern of agriculture. He seemed much inter[illegible] corn belt. He spent a good bit of time in the plane [illegible] geography textbook and studying maps.

[illegible] interest in the United States constitution, law [illegible], public education and asked a number of questions.

[illegible] with U.S. national unity. Apparently he [illegible] regionalism a predominant force with country-wide [illegible] second. He was surprised, therefore, when [illegible] of the U.S. he found people talking in pretty much the [illegible] same. He was especially impressed by the way women [illegible] orientation as men. He noted also the great [illegible] American flags flying.

[illegible] contemporary French affairs.

[illegible] San Francisco Colonel de Wavrin was party to a long and [illegible] with a Frenchwoman, in the course of which he [illegible] anti-communist attitude. Among other things he [illegible] of France was anti-communist, in fact that the

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political temper of France today was more conservative than Vichy. He noted de Gaulle's want of ability to get along with people and told some anecdotes to illustrate his point.

9. After de Mavrin had read last week's article in Life about de Gaulle his impressions were asked. He said that he thought that it was generally quite good and then expanded on this in the following manner:

"The article makes one important point about de Gaulle, namely that he is a devout Catholic with a Protestant (Puritan) tinge. This fact would not be forgotten. It is probably the strongest motivating force in his makeup.

"The part of the article which discusses the problems facing France today is also very true. Unless de Gaulle can unify France, restore order, and start business going again within three or four months, he will be forced to resign the leadership of France."

At this juncture he was asked what the alternative to de Gaulle was. He replied, "Frankly, there is no alternative. The French are fundamentally a destructive sort of people, and they seem to prefer to live from day to day rather than to think constructively about building for the future. Thus, I predict that if de Gaulle is deposed, the political swing will be to the extreme right for a short time, then back and way over to the extreme left. This is what the communists are counting on, and it is why they are currently backing the Right. Fortunately, that the majority of people in France today are leftists but not extreme leftists, the communists wish to back the Right until it is discredited so that the leftward swing will be extreme and favor themselves to them.

"I frankly think that de Gaulle has been very smart in handling the Thorez affair. By pardoning Thorez and then allowing him to return to France, de Gaulle has put him in the position of admitting that he was a criminal. This will definitely tend to discredit Thorez in the eyes of the French people. De Gaulle's manner of handling the communists, therefore, is to keep in the leadership of the French Communist Party all the pre-1939 leaders, a group which is discredited in France and which would probably never get the backing of the French people."

10. On the occasions the subject of who picked the French representatives, military and civilian, in this and other countries and their qualifications arose, de Mavrin said that a few days before his departure from France he had suggested to de Gaulle to send younger and more enthusiastic men as French representatives to foreign governments. De Gaulle said that he intended to adhere strictly to the rule that nobody would be sent to a country which he liked and admired, as such people's reports would not be objective. De Mavrin said that as he despised Russia, he would probably be sent there on a mission after his present trip to France. He opined that a man like General Saint-Didier was the wrong man to have as Chief of the French Military Mission in Washington.

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too hand-offish and too anti-American.

As to the problems facing his own organisation in France, he ... the outstanding one that of keeping out of politics in his ... country so as not to prejudice the continued financial support ... organization.

France and the United States.

... asked how the popularity of Americans compared to the ... in North Africa and France and his reply was that the ... were not liked in North Africa, as many of the soldiers ... too much, which caused fights and senseless arguments. He had ... the British constantly tried to put the Americans ... bad light, especially at present in France and as many French... still think of America as a country of Indians, cowboys, buffaloes, ... few gum-chewing civilians, the British were quite successful in ... efforts to lower American prestige. However, whenever Frenchmen ... in close collaboration with Americans they much prefer them to ... The pity is that only a very small percentage of the ... the occasion to work with Americans.

... stated that de Gaulle's visit to this country had ... successful and although his visit had only been of ... he was favorably impressed with the warm reception ... wherever he went.

... Plans.

... outlined for a trip to South America to include ... Brazil, and the Argentine. The OSS has been asked ... for the Colonel and one of his associates (the ... to be returned to France after visiting Mexico City) to ... the Panama Canal.

After returning from South America, the two officers are ... to proceed via Australia to India for subsequent work there ... with Indo-China. The Colonel has indicated that he ... be glad to be of any assistance possible to OSS either in South America or in connection with Indo-China.

A number of business contacts were being sought, primarily ... chemical manufacturing concerns. These are being ... for by personal visits of the Colonel to the establishments.

... approximately 1000-mile motor trip through the Eastern and ... States is under way. For some unaccounted reason, ... Massachusetts is given as a point to visit.

...

While in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, the Colonel ... by what appeared to be pre-arrangement from ... In New York City he received calls ... Belgian ...

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The three officers, and especially Colonel de Wavrin, seemed well supplied with funds. The latter bought a gold Dunhill lighter at the going price of $250. Captain Mansion was able to buy about a month of cowboy clothes.

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[illegible] on Three French Officers, and [illegible] Reactions to Their Recent Tour of the United States

[illegible] group consisted of Colonel Andre de Wavrin, [illegible], and Captain Maurice Raymond. All three [illegible] the same age: 38. The Colonel was the dominating [illegible]. [illegible] captains held him in highest admiration and [illegible] trip, in all official matters, held themselves [illegible] background. In unofficial matters the [illegible] Captain Raymond, by virtue of his outgoing personality, [illegible] often overshadowed de Wavrin as a [illegible]. Raymond had been an old friend and classmate of de Wavrin [illegible] Polytechnique and had subsequently been an officer [illegible] at [illegible]. After Vichy lost control of [illegible] de Wavrin had Raymond transferred to his staff. [illegible] they would have had to fire on each [illegible] in the [illegible] period. As a regular Raymond had [illegible] military background and outlook from that of [illegible].

[illegible] was a reservist and had joined the [illegible] as soon as it was founded. He spent 33 [illegible] service as an underground operative in [illegible] fully [illegible] the life of an irregular—who is the [illegible] in the light of his [illegible] not surprising that he and Raymond should [illegible].

* * * * *

[illegible], such as they are, which follow are mainly [illegible] Colonel, who as already noted was the dominating [illegible].

[illegible] de Wavrin had an insatiable curiosity about the [illegible] and was indefatigable in his [illegible]. [illegible] can be called [illegible]. He [illegible] to [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible] a desire for close liaison between his DGSS [illegible] now engaged in overt intelligence work [illegible] primarily that of M/A. He said he [illegible] to call upon his staff for informa- [illegible] selected, he submit their political and [illegible]. He further bespoke an interest [illegible] whereby there would be a free inter- [illegible] with his Service. He stated that he [illegible] establishment of a similar arrangement with his [illegible] England, and that such an arrangement was in

[illegible] the hope that he could play host to an OSS [illegible].

[illegible] problems of the United States.

[illegible] New York and Chicago he posed to banking and industrial [illegible] of the United States's ability to get along [illegible]. In Chicago during the course of the ensuing [illegible] of the United States in the analogy of the [illegible] eventually come to no good end [illegible] among a number of small savages with small [illegible] in which the United States would buy abroad [illegible]. Repeatedly the comment was made that the United [illegible] of taking a leading role in international [illegible] and the dominant forces [illegible] within its boundaries. Many comments were made [illegible] the American electorate as to the [illegible] complications of European affairs.

[illegible] bank president told him that France [illegible] of funding her outstanding [illegible] country. Colonel de Verrin appeared to agree [illegible] to express his regret.

[illegible] in the location of U.S. [illegible] by the oil development on [illegible]. He also asked what proportion [illegible] from Mexico. Apparently he [illegible] in 1911 [illegible] consumption and almost [illegible].

[illegible] by the [illegible] air development and [illegible] of the large stock of [illegible].

[illegible]

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[illegible] of the factories and the appearance of the workmen, [illegible] had always labored under the impression that [illegible] was bored to death doing a very monotonous [illegible] work. He admitted that all the workmen he had [illegible] were [illegible] and healthier than their French counterparts [illegible]

[illegible] the reactions of de Havrin and Raymond to America, [illegible] (a) both were struck with how [illegible] in this country is (even the women to a [illegible]) [illegible] individuality in people [illegible]. In France they are used to individuality in [illegible] articles. As an example of this, de Havrin cited [illegible] French cruisers which came to navy yards in this [illegible]. He said that American engineers were amazed [illegible] that these three ships were [illegible] in spite of the fact that [illegible] construction of each was completely [illegible]. Both men were impressed with the spectacle of [illegible] and they were even more struck by American [illegible], they, as engineers, were highly [illegible] the vision, planning, and organizational ability of [illegible]. This ability was amply demonstrated to them by [illegible] the thousands of parts necessary to make an airplane [illegible] the right place, at the right time, and in the right [illegible]

[illegible] de Havrin indicated surprise that the newspapers [illegible] of the 7 November election in such a few days [illegible] known.

[illegible] times on the trip he evinced interest in U.S. [illegible] in the pattern of agriculture. He seemed much interested in the [illegible]. He spent a good bit of time in the plane [illegible] a U.S. geography textbook and studying maps.

[illegible] seemed interested in the United States constitution, law [illegible] of course, public education and asked a number of questions.

[illegible] was impressed with U.S. national unity. Apparently he [illegible] with country-wide [illegible]. He was surprised, therefore, when [illegible] he found people talking in pretty much the [illegible]. He was apparently impressed by the [illegible] [illegible] also the great [illegible] of American flags flying.

[illegible] French affairs.

[illegible] de Havrin was party to a long and [illegible] with a Frenchman. In the course of this he [illegible] attitude. Among other things he [illegible] of France was [illegible]. In fact [illegible]

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[illegible] temper of France today was more conservative than Vichy. [illegible] de Gaulle's lack of ability to get along with people and [illegible] instances to illustrate his point.

[illegible] de Lattre had read last week's article in *Life* about [illegible] his impressions were asked. He said that he thought that [illegible] quite good and then expanded on this in the follow- [illegible]:

"[illegible] article misses one important point about de Gaulle, namely [illegible] a devout Catholic with a Protestant (Puritan) tinge. This [illegible] be forgotten. It is probably the strongest motivat- [illegible] his makeup.

"The part of the article which discusses the problems facing [illegible] is also very true. Unless de Gaulle can unify France, [illegible], and start [illegible] going again within three or four [illegible] he will be forced to resign the leadership of France."

[illegible] he was asked what the alternative to de Gaulle [illegible], "Frankly, there is no alternative. The French are [illegible] a contradictory sort of people, and they seem to prefer [illegible] rather than to think constructively about building for [illegible]. Thus, I predict that if de Gaulle is deposed, the [illegible] will go to the extreme Right for a short time, then [illegible] to the extreme Left. This is what the communists [illegible], and it is why they are currently pushing the Right. [illegible] the majority of people in France today are leftists [illegible], the communists wish to back the Right until [illegible] the leftward swing will be extreme and [illegible]."

"[illegible] that de Gaulle has been very smart in handling [illegible], by [illegible] Thorez and then allowing him to [illegible], de Gaulle has put him in the position of [illegible]. This will definitely tend to discredit Thorez [illegible] French people. De Gaulle's manner of handling the [illegible] in the leadership of the French [illegible] leaders, a group which is discredited [illegible] which would probably never [illegible] the backing of the French [illegible]."

[illegible] the French [illegible] in this and other countries [illegible] brought up. [illegible] before his departure from France he [illegible] de Gaulle [illegible] young and more enthusiastic and [illegible] foreign governments. De Gaulle said [illegible] his present trip [illegible] the French Military Mission in Washington.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

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[illegible] and too anti-American.

[illegible] his own organization in France, he [illegible] of keeping out of politics in his [illegible] to prejudice the continued financial support [illegible]

[illegible] United States.

[illegible] asked how the popularity of Americans compared to the [illegible] Africa and France and his reply was that the [illegible] in North Africa, as many of the soldiers [illegible] fights and senseless arguments. He had [illegible] British constantly tried to put the Americans [illegible] especially at present in France and as such [illegible] of America as a country of Indians, cowboys, buffaloes, [illegible] the British were quite successful in [illegible] prestige. However, [illegible] they much prefer them to [illegible] that only a very small percentage of the [illegible] seen with Americans.

He also stated that de Gaulle's visit to this country had [illegible] his visit had only been of [illegible] favorably impressed with the warm reception [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] for a trip to South America to include [illegible] and the Argentines. [illegible] has been asked [illegible] and one of his associates (the [illegible] Mexican Army [illegible]) to [illegible]

[illegible] South America, [illegible] officers [illegible] Colonel [illegible] in South [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

SECRET

[illegible] The three officers, and especially Colonel de Wavrin, seemed [illegible] [illegible] with [illegible]. The latter bought a gold Dunhill lighter [illegible] the [illegible] price of $200. Captain Kinsley was able to buy about [illegible] worth of cowboy clothes.

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The following individuals have been sent letters of appreciation from Colonel Atherton Richards for courtesies extended to the visiting French officers and accompanying OSS personnel.

Mr. Gordon Rentschler
Chairman of the Board
National City Bank
Wall Street
New York City

Mr. Frank C. Ralchle
11 Niagara Street
Buffalo, New York

Mr. John E. Thompson
Ford Motor Company
Dearborn, Michigan

Mrs. Tait Cowham
900 Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, Illinois

Mr. James H. Barker
1450 North Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, Illinois

Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence Armour
988 Green Bay Road
Lake Forest, Illinois

Mr. Glen Arnum
c/o Harris, Upham & Co.
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Lt. Col. Donald M. Gregory
Office of Strategic Services
Room 402, Kohl Building
463 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California

Mrs. Robert B. Howard
1800 Leavenworth Street
San Francisco, California

Mr. Thomas T. Kent
Smithfield, California

Mrs. William Lund
Smithfield, California

Mr. Harry S. Bent
c/o Corite Corporation
1250 Rio Vista Avenue
Los Angeles 23, California

Mr. Martin H. Easton
Office of Strategic Services
1130 Rowan Building
458 South Spring Street
Los Angeles 13, California

Commander John Ford
c/o Mr. James K. McGuinnis
M-G-M Studios
Culver City, California

Mr. Harry B. Kelleher
1220 Canal Building
New Orleans, Louisiana

Captain Emerson Cook
415 Sea Spray Avenue
Palm Beach, Florida

Lt. Col. Robert Hornsby
c/o Military Intelligence Division
Roosevelt Building
1410 Second Avenue
Miami, Florida

November 18, 1944

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ITINERARY FOR COLONEL [illegible] PARTY

Date	Day	City, State	Hotel
[illegible] 1	Wednesday	Detroit, Michigan	The Statler
2 3	Thursday Friday	Chicago, Illinois	Palmer House
4	Saturday	Colorado Springs Colorado	Broadmoor Hotel
5	Sunday	San Francisco, Calif.	Mark Hopkins Hotel
6 7 8	Monday Tuesday Wednesday	Los Angeles, Calif.	Ambassador Hotel
9	Thursday	Santa Fe, New Mexico	The Inn
10	Friday	New Orleans, La.	Roosevelt
11 12	Saturday Sunday	Miami, Florida	Columbus
13	Monday	Washington, D. C.	Statler (Reservations for 8)

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

ITINERARY

Depart La Guardia Field, N.Y.	8:30 AM
Arr. Buffalo or Niagara Falls, N.Y.	
Depart Buffalo or Niagara Falls, N.Y.	3:30 PM
Arr. Detroit, Michigan	
Depart Detroit (for Chicago)	4:00 PM
Arr. Chicago	9:00 AM
Dep. Colorado Springs, Colorado	
Arrive Colorado Springs	10:00 AM
Dep. Oakland, California (Airport)	
Arrive Mills Field (San Francisco)	5:00 PM
Dep. Los Angeles	
Arrive Los Angeles	9:00 AM
Dep. Santa Fe, New Mexico, via Boulder Dam and Grand Canyon	
Arrive Santa Fe	10:00 AM
Dep. Fort Worth, Tx.	
Arrive New Orleans	10:00 AM
Dep. New Orleans	
Arr. Miami, Florida	
Depart Miami	10:00 AM
Arr. Washington, D. C.	

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Director's Office

USS Form 3154

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ITINERARY

[illegible]	Leave La Guardia Field, N. Y.	8:30 AM
	Ar at Buffalo or Niagara Falls, N.Y.	
	Leave Buffalo or Niagara Falls, N. Y.	4:30 PM
	Ar at Detroit, Michigan	
	Leave Detroit (for Chicago)	4:00 PM
	Leave Chicago	9:00 AM
	Ar at Colorado Springs, Colorado	
	Leave Colorado Springs	10:00 AM
	Ar at Oakland, California (Airport)	
	Leave Oakland Field (San Francisco)	1:00 PM
	Ar at Los Angeles	
	Leave Los Angeles	9:00 AM
	Ar at Santa Fe, New Mexico, via Kansas City and Grand Canyon	
	Leave Santa Fe	10:00 AM
	Ar at New Orleans, La.	
	Leave New Orleans	11:00 AM
	Ar at Miami, Florida	
	Leave Miami	10:00 AM
	Ar at Washington, D. C.	

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

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Date 2 Nov 44

General Donovan

Attached is itinerary of Passy group for South American trip with French Military Mission. Our help is desired only to aid in getting transportation priorities. Col. Kirk thinks we would only have to explain they had been helpful to us; that we wanted to reciprocate by facilitating their trip. I pointed out we must avoid appearing to be sending them to South America. In this (illegible) office of the Executive (illegible)

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15,465

PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS SYSTEM WASHINGTON, D. C. REpublic 5700

Itinerary for Col. Andre de Wavrin

Capt. Maurice [illegible]

Capt. Jacques Mansion

		DATE	HOUR	TRIP NO.
___ Day	Lv Washington	11/24	9:45 P.M.	EAL - 21
	Ar Brownsville	11/25	8:00 A.M.	
___ Day	Lv Brownsville	11/25	9:30 A.M.	503
	Ar Mexico	11/25	11:30 A.M.	"
___ Day	Lv Mexico	11/29	11:30 A.M.	503
	Ar Guatemala	11/29	3:30 P.M.	"
___ Day	Lv Guatemala	11/30	7:00 A.M.	507
	Ar Balboa	11/30	4:30 P.M.	"
___ Day	Lv Balboa	12/2	5:30 A.M.	[illegible]
	Ar Lima	12/2	[illegible]	"
___ Day	Lv Lima	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Ar Santiago	[illegible]	[illegible]	"
___ Day	Lv Santiago	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Ar Buenos Aires	[illegible]	[illegible]	"
___ Day	Lv Buenos Aires	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Ar Montevideo	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
___ Day	Lv Montevideo	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Ar Rio de Janeiro	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
___ Day	Lv Rio de Janeiro	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Ar [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS SYSTEM WASHINGTON, D.C. REpublic 5700

Itinerary for Page 2

Col. de Marris, Capt. Raymond

and Capt. Hassler

		DATE	HOUR	TRIP NO.
Day	Lv Belem	12/19	8:00 A.M.	208
	Ar Cayenne	12/19	10:00 A.M.	208
Day	Lv Cayenne	12/21	10:00 A.M.	208
	Ar Port of Spain	12/21	5:00 P.M.	"
Day	Lv Port of Spain	12/23	7:00 A.M.	504
	Ar LaGuaira	12/23	10:00 P.M.	"
Day	Lv LaGuaira	12/26	6:30 A.M.	450
	Ar Miami	12/26	5:30 P.M.	"
Day	Lv Miami	12/27	12:00 Noon	430
	Ar Havana	12/27	1:30 P.M.	"
Day	Lv Havana	12/31	1:45 P.M.	420
	Ar Miami	12/31	3:30 P.M.	"
Day	Lv Miami	1/1/45	9:00 A.M.	PAL 6
	Ar Washington	1/1/45	4:12 P.M.	"
Day	Lv			
	Ar			
Day	Lv			
	Ar			
Day	Lv			
	Ar			

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French Mission 13,465

TOP SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
FREE

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Letter
✓ Memo } re French Mission
Cable

DATED: 15 December 1944

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT:

Minutes of Staff Meeting of 15 December give a long account of the French Mission Tour as reported by Col. Richards

ORIGINAL FILED IN: Staff Meeting Minutes

FILE #:

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15,465

[illegible]

ATTERWA[illegible]

Le 14 Novembre 1944

Mon Général,

Je ne veux pas tarder davantage pour vous remercier de la charmante hospitalité que vous avez bien voulu réserver à nos officiers, comme à nous-mêmes.

Grâce à vous nous avons pu en un temps record prendre contact avec et apprécier votre immense pays. Partout nous avons trouvé la puissance, le rendement, la beauté et le charme, la jeunesse, la volonté créatrice. Inutile de vous dire que nous [illegible] tous [illegible] ; [illegible] plus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] à chaque [illegible] que nous [illegible] [illegible]

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instant "at home" grâce à la sollicitude
des officiers américains qui furent pour
nous plus que de charmants compagnons
de route mais en réalité des amis.

J'espère avoir l'occasion un jour de
pouvoir faire connaître un peu la France
à de nombreux amis américains mais
je ne perdrai pas de temps à mon retour
en Europe pour faire connaître à tous
mes amis français la puissante et humaine
impression que j'ai recueillie ici.

Veuillez agréer, mon Général, avec
encore tous mes remerciements, l'expression
de mes très respectueux sentiments.

André Dewavrin

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SECRETARIAT
14 4/2
1944 NOV 9 PM 12 15 32 7

OSS

CONFIRMATION COPY OF A
TELEPHONED MESSAGE (INCOMING)
TELEPHONED TO [illegible] BY [illegible]
AT [illegible] (TIME AND DATE)

[illegible] 11

[illegible] UNIVERSITY CALIF NOV 9 1944 [illegible]

[illegible] STRATEGIC SERVICES OFFICE

[illegible] HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. WILL SEND COMPLETE

[illegible] REPORT NINE DAYS

[illegible]

Transfer to Col. Parry

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HENRY E. KELLEHER
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW
SUITE 1610 CANAL BUILDING
NEW ORLEANS

CABLE ADDRESS
"HENWOO"

November 3, 1944.

Lt.(j.g.) E. C. Putnell Jr.,
c/o Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ned:

I acknowledge with thanks your letter of the 28th confirming our telephone conversation had on that date.

Since my conversation with you and the receipt of your letter, I have succeeded in making arrangements for dinner in the Rex room at Antoine's, which I hope will be quite satisfactory. I have further made reservations for the Blue Room at the Roosevelt Hotel after dinner. From that point forward, we shall pursue whatever strikes the fancy of the distinguished guests. I believe we will be able to give them a fairly satisfactory evening. I think I have lined up three or four attractive young ladies who I hope will appeal to the visitors.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

HEK:KM

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

French Mission B/465

SECRETARIAT

TO : Lt. E.J. Putzell

FROM : Henry Bertram Hill HBH

DATE: 2 November 1944

SUBJECT: Information Concerning Passy

1944 NOV 2 PM 6 07 x Passy, Colonel

OSS

In conformity with our telephone conversation I am writing to you to find out the rank and title used by Brigadier General Passy (de Wavrin) as indicated in his French Travel Orders, and the title employed by Jacques Soustelle in signing them. My curiosity is aroused by the fact that a reliable source has informed me that Passy superseded Soustelle as the Chief of the French Intelligence Services some weeks ago.

I also understand that Passy is travelling with the rank of Colonel, although it is public knowledge that he was promoted to Brigadier General when he was loaned to General Koenig. I am also anxious to know whether Passy's first name is Pierre or André or, in other words, which of two brothers he is. French sources have been somewhat misleading in this minor matter, perhaps intentionally so.

Edd M. Hill

EJP 11/4

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[illegible handwritten notations]

28 October 1944.

Major General Harold L. George,
Commanding General,
Air Transport Command,
Room 1544,
Gravelly Point, Virginia.

Dear General George: Attention: Colonel Ray Ireland.

I refer to my letter of 26 October 1944, in which this Agency requested your Command to make available to us at LaGuardia Airport, New York City, on 1 November 1944, an airplane and crew, suitable for transporting eight passengers within the continental limits of the United States.

Plans have now been completed for the itinerary of the proposed trip as follows:

November 1	Leave La Guardia Field, New York For Buffalo, New York	9:30 am
	Leave Buffalo, New York For Detroit, Michigan	3:30 pm
November 2	Leave Detroit, Michigan For Chicago, Illinois	4:00 pm
November 3	Leave Chicago, Illinois For Colorado Springs, Colorado	9:00 am
November [illegible]	Leave Colorado Springs, Colorado For Oakland, California	10:00 am
November [illegible]	Leave Hamilton Field (San Francisco, California) For Los Angeles, California	5:30 pm
November [illegible]	Leave Los Angeles, California For Santa Fe, New Mexico via Boulder Dam and Grand Canyon.	9:00 am
November [illegible]	Leave Santa Fe, New Mexico For San Antonio, Texas via Randolph Field or Kelly Field, San Antonio, Texas.	10:00 am

[illegible]

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November 11 Leave New Orleans, Louisiana
For Miami, Florida. 10:00 am

November [illegible] Leave Miami, Florida
For Washington, D. C. 10:00 am

Upon arrival in Washington, D. C. we shall release the plane.

It is, of course, understood that this proposed flight schedule is subject to weather conditions and the hours given may be altered due to [illegible].

Please be assured that I am most appreciative of the cooperation and service received from your Command in connection with this operation.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

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15,465
French [illegible]
x [illegible], CAS
x [illegible]

24 October 1944

Major General Harold L. George
Commanding General
Air Transport Command
Room 1944, Gravelly Point

Attention: Colonel Ray Ireland

Dear General George:

Three French officers: Colonel Andre Dewavrin, Captain Maurice [illegible], Captain [illegible], have been attached to the Office of Strategic Services for temporary duty. With the consent of Generals Eisenhower and deGaulle they are being brought to this country for 4 or 5 weeks.

As you know this organization is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the collection of secret intelligence and the conduct of special operations against the enemy. In furtherance of our [illegible] against Germany we have had the cooperation of these representatives of deGaulle's intelligence service and are continuing to receive their help. It has become desirable for us to bring these officers to the United States for conferences and to make plans for the furtherance of our activities against Germany.

In connection with the visit of these officers we are planning to take them to several cities in this country within the short period of [illegible] for their stay here. [illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

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We will, of course, be pleased to make reservations for lodging of the crew on the trip.

Since we do not contemplate taking these officers to any installation described in AR 380-5, Sections 50A and 75a(1), we do not consider it necessary to obtain clearance from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 as required by these regulations. However, we have informed General Bissell of the pending visit, and should it become necessary to revise our plans we shall of course comply with existing regulations.

Please let me take this opportunity to express the appreciation of AEC for the cooperation rendered from all branches of your organization and for the many facilities extended to us.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

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15 46 [illegible]
French [illegible]
[illegible] 154-[illegible]
14 [illegible]

[illegible] October 1944

Mr. [illegible] Travers
Chief, [illegible]
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

[illegible]

My dear Mr. Travers:

This will confirm conversation had by Miss [illegible] of this agency with Mr. Eliot [illegible]. It would be [illegible] appreciated if the Department of State would authorize the [illegible] in London to issue [illegible] visas to the following French officers who are attached to this agency, so that they may proceed to the United States [illegible]:

[illegible]

[illegible] Jacques [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] transportation has been arranged [illegible] French [illegible]

Sincerely yours,

[illegible]

[illegible]

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

N° 465
French Mission

United States
SECRET
Equals British [illegible] SECRET

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

BY AIRPOUCH

APO 887
12 October 1944

Brig General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th & E Streets
Washington, D.C.

Dear General:

As mentioned in recent cable, we have had Colonel Dewavrin (Passy) Captain Lamerieux and Captain Manuel attached to OSS to simplify administrative matters. This procedure will facilitate OSS securing travel orders for them. Also payment of per diem.

Enclosed are two copies of the attachment orders. Your adjutant's office will want one copy and they may wish to have other copies made to give Colonel Passy in connection with other travel orders which may be written in Washington.

With kind personal regards.

Respectfully yours,

[illegible]
Colonel, OSS

United States
SECRET
Equals British [illegible] SECRET

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GOUVERNEMENT PROVISOIRE
DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
- - - - - - - -
PRESIDENCE DU CONSEIL

D.G.S.S.

1, Avenue du Marechal Maunoury
Paris, 16eme
No. 207

SECRET

Paris, le 5 octobre 1944

Le Directeur general des Services speciaux
a Monsieur le Colonel BRUCE
Chef de L'O.S.S. a PARIS

J'ai l'honneur de detacher aupres des services de L'O.S.S. pour une mission temporaire et de nature confidentielle les officiers dont les noms suivent:

Colonel DEVAVRIN
Capitaine LANDRIEUX
Capitaine MANNION

/s/ Jacques Soustelle

- -

From : General Director of Special Services

To : Colonel Bruce
Chief, OSS

I hereby attach to the O.S.S. for a temporary mission of a confidential nature the following officers:

Colonel DEVAVRIN
Captain LANDRIEUX
Captain MANNION

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY,

[signature]
MITCHELL I. ISTIALKA
1st Lt, AUS
Asst Adjutant

SECRET

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

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SECRET

[illegible] DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
[illegible] THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

Fwd [illegible] 15465

x Poissy, OC [illegible]

x [illegible]

[illegible]

APO [illegible]
12 October 194[illegible]

[illegible] William J. Donovan
[illegible] of Strategic Services
[illegible]
Washington, D.C.

[illegible]

[illegible] in Forward [illegible] General [illegible] attached [illegible] will facilitate OSS [illegible] of per diem.

[illegible] of the [illegible] orders. Your [illegible] in connection with [illegible] travel orders which [illegible] Washington.

[illegible]

Respectfully yours,

[illegible]

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Personal Background

His real name is Lt. Col. de Wavrin, (or Devravin) His code name is Col. Passy. Born 1905. He comes from the 16th arrondissement of Paris. He is a former regular army officer. Pupil at Polytechnique 1926-28. Capt. [illegible] Artillery in 1937. In 1939, he was a captain in the reserve. Therefore had left the army between 1937 and 1939 to enter private business. His family are wealthy North French Industrialists (weavers) with a great family fortune. He is a Catholic and a strong, determined and ruthless Rightist. He was a definitely important member of the Cagoulards. He is absolutely fearless and has often been dropped and picked up by plane inside France. It is reported that he is opposed by several individuals in the Algiers Government, that he has no definite creed and is accused of Fascist tendencies, and that he and Koenig are reported to be secretly anti-Jew. He was in charge of irrigation projects on the Niger Valley at Sagar.

His brother, Andre Devravin, was born in 1911. Captain Engineering Corps, [illegible], still is in 1939. Former pupil Ecole Pol. 1932-39.

MID, General Information Report, 12 June 1944
OSS, French Political Section, NAA, 28 Sept. 1944

Summaries of Reports Received

Algiers has received a demand from London that he head the de Gaulle underground groups in France, and a request for passage for him to Algiers so that he may include, under himself, all subversive work from North Africa. Passy plans to work with the British alone.

OSS, Algiers, 3 June 1943

Lt. Col. Andrew Passy has been named in a damage suit filed in the London [illegible] by Maurice Henri Dufour.

New York Times, 12 September 1945

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...d of Resistance and Action, one of the three sections of the French Police and Military Security under Soustelle; he will be occupied with maintenance of connections with the resistance groups in France. Headed the services of the Fighting French in London; he is the great beneficiary in the changes in the Military Security and Police. He is the one who possesses real and practically exclusive powers; Soustelle theoretically tops Passy but will have no real authority. Such extended power, centralized in the hands of one man can be very dangerous when the man is Colonel Passy. The latter was before the war a Fascist, and since the Armistice, as head of de Gaulle's 2ème Bureau, he is alleged to have followed a very shrewd policy leading to increase his personal power and that of his political friends. He is also known to be very anti-American and to favor xenophobious tendencies in the Resistance Movement. He is extremely clever and capable, as well as active. His success indicates a rise of influence of the extreme-rightist, super-nationalist and fanatical ...alist elements in the French administration.

London and Algiers, 29 November 1943

The Communists are out to get Passy, the recently appointed head of es... [illegible] information section of the D.S.T. The reason for this, source has been told, is that the Communists complain that they have no contacts with their groups in France except through Passy.

State Department Source, 23 December 1943

In the Organization Chart of the Services Speciaux set up in accordance with the secret decree of 18 November 1943 Passy is head of Technical Direction.

Officers in high positions in the French Intelligence Service

...ffered his resignation to de Gaulle due to a conflict with Emmanuel [illegible] in Algeria over the control of the B.C.R.A.

French Political [illegible] Report, [illegible] March 1944

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During March 1944, a tract was secretly circulated in Algiers containing an attack believed to be directed against Passy. The tract said that with all this respect to Vallon, who had recently made statements in the Consultative Assembly about certain liaison sections of the secret services, one should not confuse a body that is healthy on the whole with one of its leaders who uses this body less to serve the Resistance than his own political ends, and who seeks to manouver the Resistance so as to make it his own monopoly, systematically removing all competition that discredited him, no matter what prejudice he thus creates against his cause. When the first misdeeds of the one whom we are denouncing were reported in London to General de Gaulle, the latter replied "He has done much good work and I have no one to replace him."

Tangier, March 1944

Chief of Staff of Koenig. It has been reported by a good source in Algiers that he is to be made Chief of Paris Police.

MID MA Report JICANA, 23 August 1944

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EXCERPTS FROM OSS R&A REPORT NO. [illegible]

From the known appointments to the higher administrative offices in the new intelligence agency, it appears that the Services de Recherches et Contre-Espionnage will be directed chiefly by the former BCRA elements. The return of Colonel Passy to the intelligence services especially, has caused some misgivings in the more leftist political circles of France where the intelligence services have recently been charged with fomenting civil war and preparing the way for dictatorship. It is of interest, therefore, to determine the possibilities of political action afforded by the organization and personnel of the intelligence services.

1. Partisan [illegible] of the Personnel of the French Intelligence Services.

In the few weeks preceding the reorganization of the [illegible] to form the [illegible], the French intelligence services were subjected to a bitter attack by the extreme leftist political press, [illegible] their dissolution on the grounds that they were not sufficiently amenable to Government authority. In fact, while the reorganization of the intelligence groups was [illegible] by the [illegible] direction of [illegible], the [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] by the [illegible] [illegible].

Copies of this report have been [illegible] to the [illegible] and the Department of [illegible].

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[illegible] agency. The distrust which surrounds the [illegible] intelligence services is nothing new, however, and has [illegible] of a partisan tone. In the pre-liberation [illegible] the Allied recognition of the FCNL as the [illegible] authority for liberated France, the BCRA and [illegible], the [illegible], were the object of various [illegible] by generally conservative and anti-Gaullist groups of [illegible] located in England and America. Predicated [illegible] belief that the Gaullist intelligence services [illegible] at the establishment of dictatorship in liberated [illegible] charges included: (1) the use of Gestapo-like [illegible] French escapees who came to England [illegible] exercised wide control over French nationals, [illegible] of political Resistance within France in [illegible] the undisputed leadership of de Gaulle, [illegible] in the arming and supplying of military [illegible] in a manner calculated to facilitate the foundation [illegible] state. While some of these accusations, [illegible] implications of dictatorship, [illegible] the Consultative Assembly, they [illegible] the idea of discrediting the [illegible] Allied circles and of [illegible] General [illegible] the liberation of France and the [illegible]

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the new Provisional Government at Paris, the conservative [illegible] of the preliberation period [illegible] rallied to the [illegible] or maintained a discreet silence. The Services Speciaux, however, found themselves attacked from a new direction, this time by the Communists and other elements of Resistance who are apparently dissatisfied with the failure of the Provisional Government to put into immediate operation the political, economic and social policies of the more extreme left. Because of the pre-liberation background of the charges of [illegible] coming from conservative groups, but more because of the [illegible] conservative nature of their personnel, the [illegible] services offer to these leftist groups an excellent [illegible] political propaganda designed to arouse public [illegible] that is deemed to be the "conservative" attitude of the Provisional Government.

[illegible]. Political Complexion of the Intelligence Services

The attacks which have been levelled against the Services Speciaux by extreme leftist circles and which probably [illegible] against the new organization may be attributed [illegible] to the political complexion of the intelligence [illegible]. With the exception of Jacques Soustelle, the leading [illegible] of the intelligence services appear to be of [illegible] background and views. The majority are [illegible] army officers with the traditional conservative

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[illegible] of the French military and not a few, drawn from the [illegible] Services, have a record of former Vichy service. [illegible], too, the charge that the intelligence services have a liberal sprinkling of ex-Cagoulards is still repeated, with Passy offered as the classic example. While the charge as applied to Passy may be doubted, it is reasonable to believe that the general accusation has an element of truth. At the time of the 1940 Armistice the Cagoule, which had been in the [illegible] of Fascist conspiracies in pre-war France, is said to have split into three groups. One section, which gathered at [illegible] associated itself with collaborationist elements. The second group, allegedly anti-Laval but pro-Pétain, went to unoccupied France where it passed under the leadership of [illegible] Peyrouton, then Minister of Interior. Presumably some members of this group crossed to North Africa after the Allied invasion and associated themselves with the Giraudist regime. The third division, called the "plebians of the Cagoule," reportedly went to London to join the de Gaulle movement. [illegible] these ex-Cagoulards are now associated with the present intelligence service, it can only be assumed that their political sympathies lie with the more conservative [illegible] groups in France.

[illegible] personnel of the French intelligence services along with certain conservative members of the Provisional Government have often been identified with synarchie, which [illegible] defined loosely as a political and economic movement

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[illegible]

[illegible] at the control of the state by an industrial, financial and [illegible] elite. Synarchism has been linked with the [intel]ligence services by virtue of the fact that several past [and] present members of the latter's administrative staff [inclu]ding Passy, Manuel, [illegible], Palaton, and Guillaumat, are [gra]duates of the military-engineering college, the Ecole [Poly]technique, where the movement is said to have started. [As] graduation from the Ecole Polytechnique is the sole evidence [o]ffered in support of synarchist affiliations in the intelli[gence] services, little importance can be attached to this [charge]. The accusation, based as it is on the flimsiest [evi]dence, serves only to underline the existing distrust of the [services] as an organization composed of officials whose political [sym]pathies are such that they may be expected to give willing [support] only to a government of moderate left or distinctly [illegible] views.

[In] view of these facts, Communist speakers were able [illegible] Services Speciaux as composed of "[illegible]" [illegible]" and were among "[illegible] groups [illegible] still exist." Even the new Communist [illegible] of [illegible], widened the lists, [illegible] the [illegible] the [illegible] intelligence services [illegible] to the [illegible]-controlled [illegible] in the pre-liberation days and acting as [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

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the Communist Party. While such accusations were put forward with the idea of forcing the Provisional Government into a more leftist attitude, it is undeniable that there is in the entire movement an undercurrent of apprehension regarding the political influence of the intelligence services in the event that an open break occurs between the de Gaulle Government and its more extreme elements.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

HQ & SQ DETACHMENT
Office of Strategic Services
ETOUSA

13 September 1944

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of Distinguished Service Cross

TO: Commanding General, European Theater of Operations

1. a. It is recommended that Colonel André de Wavrin, of the French Army, be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

b. Colonel de Wavrin was serving on a mission in Brittany in connection with representatives of the Office of Strategic Services and with officers of the American Army at the time of the act for which he is recommended.

c. Decorations previously awarded:
1. French Croix de Guerre with two palms and one silver star.
2. Croix de la Liberation.
3. Medaille de la Resistance.
4. British Distinguished Service Order (for services rendered on a secret mission in France).
5. British Military Cross (for military gallantry in Norway).
6. Norwegian Croix de Guerre.

2. The officer recommending this award has personal knowledge of the acts upon which this recommendation is based.

3. Colonel de Wavrin is a French career officer. He graduated from the Ecole Polytechnique, and was a lecturer at St. Cyr. In the summer of 1940, after the capitulation of France, he founded the Bureau Central de Renseignement et d'Action) as a special clandestine organization within the Fighting French forces. Since that time he has served for a long time Chief of these Services for combined intelligence and sabotage activities. In April 1944, he was named Chief of Staff to General Koenig, commanding all the French Forces of the Interior.

In September 1944, the BCRA was reorganized under the title of [illegible] and Colonel de Wavrin was named by General de Gaulle as head of the new organization.

From February 1943 to April 1943, in spite of the fact that he was a head of the French Secret Services, that his identity was well

over

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[illegible] Secret Service, that if captured by the Abwehr or [illegible] (who had an exceptional reward for his capture) he was certain [illegible] to torture and eventual execution, he left London [illegible] by an aeroplane into Northern France. Throughout the [illegible] France, he organized the French Forces of the Interior [illegible] the action of networks of intelligence there.

[illegible] clothes he circulated through Northern France, [illegible] Forces of the Interior to support the impending [illegible] directed the French intelligence networks in the final drive [illegible] force from French forces which produced the major portion of [illegible] upon which the invasion of Normandy was based. During [illegible], in addition to continuously exposing himself to the great [illegible] in occupied France, he performed specific acts of [illegible] picking up and taking back to England with him an [illegible] whose plane had been shot down in France. For this [illegible] awarded him the Distinguished Service Cross.

[illegible] night of 4 August, Colonel Wavrin was parachuted into [illegible] to support the operation of the American Third [illegible] Army. This mission, after joining up with a small detachment [illegible] Third Army, endeavored to arrange the surrender of the [illegible] garrison at the Brioux Airdrome. The negotiations were [illegible] but the enemy withdrew on the arrival of the American [illegible] and a brief engagement in which Cmdt. du Perrier of Colonel [illegible] was wounded. On the afternoon of 6 August a force of 160 [illegible] 2nd Parachute Division attacked the Headquarters of Col. [illegible] Division. The headquarters was successfully defended by about 20 [illegible] members of Col. Wavrin's mission. Col. Wavrin demonstrated [illegible] and gallantry in leading the defense.

During the entire period of 5 August to 23 August, Col. Wavrin [illegible] and effective efforts in organizing liaison between [illegible] Forces in Brittany and the American Task Force A and the [illegible] Army. He continuously moved forward into enemy held territory to [illegible] these forces and mobilize their efforts in support of [illegible] advance.

[illegible] services for which the award of the Distinguished [illegible] is recommended were completed by Colonel Wavrin with the [illegible] early and the substantial conquest of Brittany in August [illegible].

[illegible]. Proposed citation - For gallantry in action behind enemy [illegible] occupied territory by circulating about in civilian clothes, [illegible] forms of certain capture and death if captured, in order to organize [illegible] and direct the procurement of intelligence for the Landing of [illegible] forces in Normandy.

CUT

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[illegible] personal courage in moving back and forth through enemy [illegible] maintain liaison between the advance elements of the American [illegible] and French resistance forces in Brittany and directing French [illegible] defending bridges and roads over which American armour was to [illegible], striking off roads and demolishing bridges to block enemy retreat, [illegible] rear of German troops, disrupting enemy communications and bringing [illegible] information to the American army.

[illegible], having showed continuous devotion to duty and inspiring [illegible] in support of the liberation of France by the Allied armies. [illegible] and leadership was in conformance of the high ideals of the [illegible] and of the U.S. Army. The nature of his mission in directing [illegible] support of the advance of the American armies and facilitating the [illegible] of the American armies in the liberation of the French people is [illegible] the tradition of warm and close friendship between the French [illegible] peoples.

D.K.E. BRUCE
Colonel, GSC
Commanding

COPY

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[illegible] is somewhat concerned at the [illegible] in favor of de Gaulle in press messages [illegible] and in their presentation at this end. [illegible] owes everything to British assistance and [illegible] cannot be considered as a trustworthy [illegible] of our country. Wherever he has been he has [illegible] a trail of Anglo-phobia behind him. An interview [illegible] in August 1941 was only the first [illegible] to play Great Britain off against the [illegible]. He has done his utmost to cause [illegible] between the British and French in Syria. It [illegible] to gain prestige in France by [illegible] with the British and French [illegible] the Americans. He has undoubtedly Fascist [illegible] tendencies; at one time he represents [illegible] against Communism; at [illegible] Communist support.

[illegible] of these just grounds for [illegible] always treated him with scrupulous [illegible] of the legend which has been raised [illegible] through the publicity facilities [illegible]. We still hope he will settle down to [illegible] the new Committee. Up to the present [illegible] complete mastery. Should he succeed [illegible] differences will immediately open [illegible]. We have to be very careful [illegible] do not spread to relations between [illegible]. The President, who is the best and [illegible] but [illegible]. The military situation in [illegible] and General Eisenhower has to think [illegible] of their [illegible]. It is therefore essential that great [illegible] questions are arising therein late[illegible].

[illegible], therefore, that British newspapers will [illegible] of coolness and impartiality in these [illegible] do their best to prevent them hindering [illegible] vigorous conduct of the war.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Fighting French 4223
X Tixier

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Foreign Nationalities Branch

April 26, 1943

The Director of Strategic Services
Department of State
Director of Psychological Warfare Room
Director, SI
Director, R and A

We have learned from a good source that Adrien Tixier, head of the Fighting French Delegation in the United States, has been asked by General de Gaulle to come to London. Tixier [illegible] reluctant to make the trip. He fears, it [illegible], that if he goes he may not return to the United States, [illegible] de Gaulle will not want to send him back, or because [illegible] will make it clear to de Gaulle that it [illegible] advantage to change his representative here. [illegible] is said to suspect that Foreign Minister [illegible] may already have made a suggestion along these [illegible] de Gaulle. Tixier claims that since Eden's [illegible] in the United States have shown a [illegible] toward the Fighting French.

DCP

DeWitt C. Poole

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CONFIDENTIAL

November 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Further regarding the French "psychological front": --

Last Friday August Heckscher of the Foreign Nationalities Branch staff called on M. Tixier pursuant to appointment. They had met and talked a number of times before.

Tixier was in a white heat of indignation. He had seen the President, he said, and told him what he thought of American relations with France.

The Fighting French, Tixier said to Heckscher, had not been informed before the events in North Africa, during the events, or after the events. The Fighting French did not enjoy getting their information from the newspapers.

Not having been informed, M. Tixier could make no comment upon the President's declaration. He was not able to pass an opinion as to the trustworthiness of Mr. Roosevelt's assurances. He was certain, however, that the negotiations with Darlan had not been entered upon without the approbation of American political authorities.

The news from North Africa was valueless. It was propaganda, presumably directed toward making Darlan's ascendancy appear necessary.

The harm that had been done in France was immense and irreparable. He had information of such a character that he preferred to keep it to himself.

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When the State Department and the White House began telling Frenchmen about France, and what France ought to do, that was too much.

It was unlikely, Tixier said to Heckscher in terminating the interview, that they would be meeting again on a happier day, when a democratic solution had been achieved. When one ceased playing with a type such as Darlan, the game was not easily concluded.

DCP

DeWitt C. Poole

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

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November 13, 1942

[illegible] General John R. Deane
[illegible] S. Chiefs of Staff
[illegible] Building
[illegible], D. C.

[illegible] General Deane:

I think that the Chiefs of Staff might [illegible] the attached memorandum on a France [illegible] held in New York on the evening of [illegible].

You will note the great emphasis placed [illegible] and the apparent effort not to have [illegible] spoken. Philip is the representative of the underground group here.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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France Forever Rally, 9085
x Poole

SECRET

November 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

The attached report on the France Forever rally in New York last evening is based upon advices by telephone.

I call your attention to the great emphasis placed upon de Gaulle and the apparently deliberate effort to avoid having the name of Giraud spoken. However, Giraud's name was spoken once and elicited applause.

DCP

DeWitt C. Poole

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November 12, 1942

FRANCE FOREVER RALLY IN NEW YORK

Under the inspiration of events in France and North Africa, a public rally was held last evening at Hunter College in the City by France Forever. The hall, with a seating capacity of about 2500, was filled to overflowing. Emotion and determination reigned.

It was quite definitely a de Gaullist rally. Professor Langlar, President of France Forever, presided. In his opening remarks, and in a longer impassioned address by Andre Philip of de Gaulle's staff, General Giraud was not mentioned. Indeed, during the whole meeting Giraud's name was spoken only once. That was by Colonel Benson of the British Army who read a message from Lord Halifax. This mention of Giraud was received with applause.

The phonographic record of the President's message to the French people was played. At first some good natured tittering was heard over the President's pronunciation. In the end many [illegible] were in tears.

[illegible] was not present but sent a message.

[illegible] and Philip (the latter speaking in English) gave [illegible] to the idea that the work of the Fighting French could [illegible] be said to approach an end; on the contrary, it was just [illegible]. North Africa had been regained, but no real use had [illegible] of the underground resistance in France, the story

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of which was told at length by Philip. Both he and Laugier predicted that it would be necessary to use the underground organizations as a means of convincing the people in France that there was not going to be imposed upon them now such a dictatorship as they had just gotten rid of.

Louis Bromfield spoke eloquently in English. He was completely pro de Gaullist, remarking at one point that de Gaulle must be at the peace conference for France.

Bromfield was bitter in denouncing the collaborationists; he referred particularly to the "opportunist" Darlan. He deplored the principle that "we cannot now welcome to our side" former Petainists. The kind of men who are to govern France in the future must be those who have been on the right side from the beginning to the end and have stood for a principle as something greater than their own lives. Bromfield elicited fervent applause.

[redacted]

It is learned confidentially that both M. Philip and Mr. Bromfield desired to speak much more strongly for de Gaulle and openly to repudiate and condemn Giraud. Raoul Aglion asserts that he succeeded in dissuading them from this course, despite [redacted] pressure in the other direction by Tixier from Washington.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

June 8, 1942

[illegible]

[illegible] Tixier's guest at dinner. He and his wife [illegible] attractive house in one of the best residential [illegible], where the rent must be substantial. [illegible] appropriate offices for his delegation [illegible] planning to penetrate the diplo- [illegible] of Washington. It is evident that [illegible] has relaxed the purse-strings in no small [illegible]

[illegible] repeated rumors that Cagoulard influ- [illegible] movement have prevented Jouhaux's [illegible] was very emphatic in stating that [illegible] investigated the matter and that [illegible] foundation at all. Tixier con- [illegible] through Portugal, Colonel Leslie of [illegible] his entire files to him. [illegible] spent two days studying these files, [illegible] of the three attempts made to get [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

[illegible] Jouhaux had refused to go ahead with [illegible] of personal safety. The last attempt, [illegible] perfected in most complete detail. Jou- [illegible] transported in an official motor car to [illegible] that point, disguised as a monk, he [illegible] on foot for 100 yards and would then have [illegible] diplomatic car. Everybody on both sides of [illegible] carefully bought. In other words, Tixier [illegible] Jouhaux.

[illegible] the subject of the "Liberation" group and the [illegible] the controversial figure of Mr. Christian [illegible] French labor leader who pledged organized [illegible] in France -- including even the Com- [illegible] that he had know Pinaud personally [illegible] years. Pinaud, according to him, was [illegible] influential in French labor circles, with [illegible] CGT. I understood Tixier to say that at [illegible] been a high official in the French Minis- [illegible] up by saying that Pinaud has now [illegible] the next time he, Tixier, visits [illegible] make a little excursion to [illegible] trying to indicate the [illegible]

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[illegible] underground technique in occupied [illegible]

[illegible] such indiscreet circulation of the [illegible] trip to London, that it would be difficult [illegible] the German authorities won't get him if he [illegible] bonafide representative of French labor re[illegible].

John C. Wiley.

[illegible]
[illegible]

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Labor leaders
De Gaulle
[illegible]

May 22, 1942

[illegible] DONOVAN:

[illegible] will [illegible] certain telegram that was sent some [illegible] hope of getting further enlightenment on [illegible] delegation of three French labor leaders pledg- [illegible] to de Gaulle. So far as I know, no reply [illegible] Grand now tells us, however, that [illegible] from London (I presume, in reply to the [illegible] informing him that of this alleged French [illegible] of three, two were Free French Military In- [illegible] posing as labor leaders, accompanied by [illegible] described as an adventurer in the [illegible] without any Catholic trade union back- [illegible] connection whatsoever with C.G.T.

[illegible] delegation is reported to have had consid- [illegible] Bevin and British Labor pledged one [illegible] as you will recall, Tixier hastened with [illegible] to Washington, D. C.

John C. Wiley.

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

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[illegible]

March 26, 1942

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] of State
[illegible]

[illegible]:

[illegible], a French citizen, is now in this [illegible] some connection -- just how close I don't [illegible] Free French; and we hear that [illegible] is [illegible] he should return to London in order to [illegible] headquarters there.

[illegible] in the American interest, [illegible] remain here. He is Secretary [illegible] which is a strong [illegible], and he has close personal [illegible] in the United States. [illegible] in this letter. [illegible] is an [illegible] flow of certain information from [illegible] We are told that if he [illegible] London, there would be a [illegible] which would [illegible] for some time. Therefore, I am venturing [illegible] to your personal [illegible] in the hope that [illegible] the possible [illegible] an opportunity possibly [illegible] change of mind on the part of [illegible] and [illegible].

[illegible] to be a delicate situation and [illegible] to [illegible] completely [illegible] I trust you to set me right in case there [illegible] to the State Department [illegible] would lead to a different attitude [illegible] or continued residence in the [illegible].

Sincerely yours,

[illegible]

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 22, 1942

SECRET
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

[illegible] came to see me this afternoon.

[illegible] a somewhat emotional state which he explained [illegible] his friends had taken what was for them [illegible] that they had only done so after deep [illegible] consideration, but that they could not contemplate [illegible] a Government headed by Laval.

[illegible] somewhat instrumental in arranging that group [illegible] in the event of Laval's appointment and, [illegible] deep responsibility in regard to the other [illegible] that had resigned.

[illegible] he was not concerned. He had roots in [illegible] joining the American forces. DeRozier, [illegible] and would ally himself with the Americans [illegible]. His deep concern was for Piot, a man of [illegible] also was approximately the same age and [illegible] that Benoit was the most trusted [illegible] in the Embassy since the time of Jusserand; [illegible] character and an expert on codes.

[illegible] the whole Nation but that we, ourselves, [illegible] the position in which these men found [illegible] know anything about our regulations [illegible] other formalities, but that if Marshal [illegible] responsibility for the others as well as himself, [illegible] what we could do in their situation [illegible]. I could, of course, make no promises [illegible] count on our good disposition.

[illegible] had been Henry-Haye's personal [illegible]. He said that he had had [illegible] the Ambassador stated that he [illegible] "[illegible]," [illegible] was the Marshal's man. He [illegible] the Marshal trusted him and he "[illegible]" [illegible] had complete control of the [illegible]

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[illegible] talked of his own situation. He has a wife [illegible] children and must find means of subsistence for them. [illegible] had to throw in his lot definitely with the Free [illegible] head of his in New York had received a cable from [illegible] London. The cable was delivered this morning. It [illegible] the effect that Marchal resigned, De Gaulle wanted [illegible] immediately to London. Marchal has to make his [illegible] arrangements and determine definitely what to do. He [illegible] rose, if he went to London, he thought it might [illegible] be worked as he thought he might do more effective [illegible] for United States among the French. In the event that [illegible] remained himself here, he hoped that we might be able to [illegible] a victory for the United Nations. I told him [illegible] means excluded that we could work in common.

[illegible] this conversation immediately to Murphy as the [illegible] departed.

SECRET

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April 23, 1942

[illegible]:

[illegible] the letter of a well-in-
[illegible] Harvard professor, may be

[illegible] at New York . . . Also
[illegible] Emile Victor - such a young
[illegible] be. It is needless to
[illegible] collaboration and that each was
[illegible] of pursuing the fight against
[illegible] that one can hardly have respect
[illegible] Vichy ('le monstre mou
[illegible] refrain from attacking the
[illegible] its [illegible], because the confidence
[illegible] French people have in it would
[illegible] in the face of certain
[illegible], however unappealing to
[illegible] would replace them with a
[illegible], and [illegible] in con-
[illegible] of the fleet would be quickly re-

[illegible] support are anxious to enter
[illegible] service. They would like to form a

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[illegible] with the Americans. And [illegible] with de Gaulle? One of their numerous [illegible] not wish to lose as the French; we [illegible] Germans but not our own people. They [illegible] for de Gaulle's speech 10 days [illegible] (an extremely bitter attack on Petain) [illegible] de Gaulle would have an easy [illegible]

[illegible] to make judgments, saying that [illegible] to form an idea of [illegible] that . . ."

John C. Wiley

[illegible]

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

January 31, 1942

To: Mr. James R. Murphy

From: William H. Vanderbilt

This is to remind you that General Sauques, Secretary-General of the Free French, will come in to see Colonel Donovan at about 10:30 a.m. next Monday, February 2nd.

General Sauques has fought with the Free French in [illegible], has only more recently been in French Equatorial Africa. I gather that he is interested in discussing with Colonel Donovan the position of the Free French in this country, and that he is somewhat concerned and perhaps dissatisfied with the present Free French representation here, although he did not say this to me himself. He speaks practically no English

WHV

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ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 7, 1942

Dear Bill:

Thank you so much for sending us the letter of December 24 from Mr. Pierre Haas. It is very interesting.

Sincerely yours,

James Clement Dunn

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

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Mussener 2520

January 5, 1942

Mr. James Dunn
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

I am sending you a letter I have received which I thought you might want to know about. I know nothing about [illegible] or of Tixier although I understand both of them have visited our office here.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Encl.
[illegible]

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2526

Free French

40 WEST 55TH STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y.

December 24, 1941.

DEC 30 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel Wm. Donovan,
2 Wall Street,
New York, N. Y.

My dear Colonel:

I have been puzzled lately by certain actions of Mr. P. A. Tixier, who is as you know the head of the Free French Delegation, 628 Fifth Avenue, since the shake-up which occurred after the visit of Mr. Pleven to this country. I have referred the matter to George Belmont, who advised me to get in touch with you.

The Admiral Muselier, Head of the Free French Naval Forces, has been in Canada for about ten days. The intention of the Admiral was to come to this country to discuss with whoever is qualified, the situation in the Pacific and, specifically, the use by your Army and Navy of the Free French possessions as bases, as well as the manning of French boats seized, partly by Free French sailors. Mr. Tixier has advised London to the Free French Headquarters, telling them that after discussing the matter with the State Department, he thought that the coming of the Admiral would be, at the present time, most inopportune.

I have enjoyed seeing you again in Washington, and had a long talk with Mr. David Bruce. I have since sent him all the data on myself and am now waiting to hear from him soon.

With kindest regards, my dear Colonel, I am,

Yours very sincerely,

Pierre Boal

PB:EJ
CC: Mr. George Belmont

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CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 8198-C

Date Rec'd SA JUN 6 1942

To	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments

[illegible] should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
[illegible] drawn across sheet under each comment.
[illegible] should be used in To column.
[illegible] initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
[illegible] should be indicated in Comments column.
[illegible] should always be returned to Registry.
[illegible] see separate sheet.

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CONFIDENTIAL

June 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Hugh R. Wilson

FROM: Allen W. Dulles

Referring to my T-K message of yesterday, with regard to the Free French situation, I have now obtained further details as to the contents of the letter which Jacques Maritain is sending to General De Gaulle. This letter is apparently in reply to a communication from De Gaulle asking him to join the Free French National Committee.

I understand that Maritain replied substantially as follows:

1 - That no one away from London should join a committee which did its work in London.

2 - That, in his view, the National Committee has no real standing as a political organization in France and that De Gaulle should restrict himself to military matters.

3 - That De Gaulle should not press the United States for political recognition of his movement and that the policy which the United States was following was the proper one.

4 - That De Gaulle should not do anything to offend American public opinion.

5 - That everything possible should be done to rally together all anti-Vichy Frenchmen, whether or not they were identified with the De Gaulle movement.

6 - That a committee of outstanding anti-Vichy French should be formed in the United States to advise with De Gaulle.

- - -

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8198-2

I have just talked on the telephone with Mr. Istel, whom I believe you know by reputation. He is one of the ablest Frenchmen here in New York, formerly a banker by profession and an expert on general economic matters as affecting France. Istel has, I believe, been in close touch with Leger and has been trying to exert influence on Tixier, who is a close friend of his.

Istel is leaving in a day or two for London, apparently in the effort to bring some order out of the increasing chaos in the Free French movement, having just returned from Washington, where I understand he has had conferences with Leger and Tixier.

I am lunching with Istel tomorrow and shall then report to you further.

A. W. D.

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Politics French 11,794
x De Gaullist Movement

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. x Brinton, Crane

June 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Donald C. McKay DCM

I am sending herewith a copy of the article on divisions within the De Gaullist movement which was written at my request by Crane Brinton and has just arrived. I am sending it in the form in which it will appear in the R.&A. Weekly. The original had some additional paragraphs which are now out of date in the light of the recent union in North Africa.

Attachment

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SECRET

MEN AROUND DE GAULLE

By one unduly narrow but useful definition, the Fighting French may be limited to General De Gaulle and his National Committee in London, with the civilian workers and armed forces depending on, and in a sense responsible to, this National Committee in all quarters of the globe. When Fighting French achievements and intentions are discussed, it is this group, and within this group the 40 or 50 soldiers, sailors, politicians, civil servants, professors and publicists who make policy, upon whom attention is inevitably focussed. But it must never be forgotten that there are millions of ordinary Frenchmen and women in France and in exile who belong in some sense to the Fighting French. The Fighting French in this sense are more than a party and less than a nation. Their leaders are, by reasons of the dispersal of their constituency, their own dependence on foreigners, the uncertainties of their mandates and responsibilities, peculiarly [illegible] the task of keeping in touch with their followers.

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Allies Outside the Movement

Even in England, the Fighting French in the narrow sense, the self-styled, can by no means be said to express the unanimous voice of their exiled fellow countrymen. The outside world, and metropolitan France in particular, have, for instance, long assumed that the famous BBC program broadcast in French at 21:15 each night is wholly under official Fighting French control. Actually out of the 45 minutes of the program's running time, the Fighting French control only five, during which the "porte-parole de la France Combattante," M. Schuman, [illegible] vibrantly. The rest of the program--news, commentaries, [illegible], messages--is controlled, through the BBC, by PWE. The brilliant Frenchmen who have made this program so successful are not [illegible] members of the Gaullist organization. These Frenchmen are, indeed, thoroughly in sympathy with the patriotic purposes of the Fighting French, but they are by no means sectarian Gaullists. One of the best-known of them, whose radio name is "Pierre Bourdan," has private life very critical of recent Fighting French [illegible] in the negotiations with Giraud.

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La France, the slim but well-edited French language London daily newspaper, represents a wider point of view than that of the [redacted] Gaullist leaders. This paper has, in the recent critical months, maintained a moderate and conciliatory attitude in striking contrast with that of the fire-eating official organ of the Fighting French, the weekly La Marseillaise. In its insistence that no narrow partisan or ideological considerations should stand in the way of the union of all Frenchmen against the Axis, [redacted] is undoubtedly more faithful to the wishes of the masses of Frenchmen in exile than is the Gaullist leadership. La France Libre, a monthly review of very high standards of objectivity, has also been quite independent of the de Gaulle organization and its editor, André Labarthe, was recently joined Giraud in North Africa as Commissioner of Information.

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SECRET

The London Group

Yet though the Fighting French movement is a bigger and a simpler thing than the group around de Gaulle, it remains true that this group is the Fighting French "government." It, in the last analysis, acts for the Fighting French. In trying to estimate the future role of France in the struggle against the Axis, one must always come back to this little group.

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They have worked for three years under conditions of which no Anglo-Saxon, however much Singapore and Pearl Harbor may have burned into his heart and mind, can have had real emotional experience. They are members of la grande nation, beaten, exiled, pensioners of a foreign government. They have not even been granted the formal status of a government-in-exile. They have had but the slightest of independent economic assets. Even of France overseas, they have seen the richest regions go to a rival group, while they themselves had only regions which, from the fiscal point of view, could be at best only self-sustaining. They had no such source of economic independence as the Royal Norwegian Government, for instance, enjoyed in the Norwegian merchant marine. As long as the Vichy Government could maintain an appearance of independence of Germany, and especially as long as the United States maintained an embassy in Vichy, they could not assert with complete assurance that [illegible] loyal to Pétain were mere quislings.

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They have been most sensitive to the fact that they are exilés, a word which French history has given overtones most disagreeable to them, and which Radio Paris has fully exploited since 1940. They are inevitably, by the mere fact that they chose the hardest and most dangerous course after the collapse of the French armies, a selected group of more than ordinary energy and convictions - and more than ordinary reluctance to make the little compromises this world exacts from those who conduct its affairs.

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They represent, finally, an almost complete political microcosm of the much-divided Third French Republic. The single passion that drove them into exile was love of France/ Nothing is clearer in recent French history than the fact that, however divided, inefficient, and perhaps corrupt the Third Republic was during the thirties, love of country was, in the exceptional individual, no monopoly of any political group. There are Communists around de Gaulle, there are Socialists, radicals, moderate Republicans - very moderate - there are Catholics and anti-clericals, there are those who once played with Fascist ideas; there are, especially among the military, men whose sympathies have in the past been Royalist. In the long run, if union with Giraud becomes complete, and if resistance groups in France prove in fact to be as united as their agents claim them to be in the single purpose of beating the Axis, this political [illegible] of the group around de Gaulle may turn out to be an asset. At present, it is pretty clearly a liability.

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SECRET

Save for their soldiers, sailors and airmen, who are substantially amalgamated with allied forces and in practice partly outside Fighting French control, and their colonial administrations, the Gaullists are a government that does not govern but agitates. They lack the final responsibilities that tend to tame even the most confirmed idealists — and intriguers. Their ranks are split in a dozen ways by individual jealousies and ambitions. Yet, roughly, the Gaullist elite may be divided into three groups: there is the military, [illegible] in background — Valin, Auboyneau, Legentilhomme, [illegible] the latter a Carmelite monk released from [illegible] in order to fight for France; there is the Left, [illegible], Diethelm, and Pleven actually on the National Committee, reinforced by the Communist Grenier and the C.G.T. leader [illegible], recently escaped from France; there are the [illegible], the right [illegible] politiques, men like [illegible] and [illegible] of the National Committee, whose main [illegible] has been to bring Gaullists and [illegible] together

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[illegible] terms with other members of the United [illegible], there is de Gaulle himself, uneasily and not [illegible] trying to drive this unruly team.

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[illegible] Left

Though originally a microcosm of the France of 1939 with representation of all the old parties, and still staffed in part [illegible] conservatives or opportunists, Fighting French leadership has [illegible] and more moved to the Left. Men like Philip claim theirs is a [illegible] Left soundly rooted in a spiritual revolution that has taken place in metropolitan France, and no longer the tired, indecisive Left of the [illegible] des Communes. These men have the revolutionist's [illegible] for the men of the old regime. And for them Giraud is a man of the old regime, no matter what he may say or do. They seem clearly [illegible] to have swept de Gaulle along with them, in spite of the General's Rightist background. Their fervor of conviction, [illegible] with his own messianic sense of mission, their contempt [illegible] compromise, so much like his own contempt for those who took the [illegible] in June 1940, their insistence that France must be reborn-- [illegible] reinforced de Gaulle's natural intransigence. Finally, the [illegible] which the United States came to appear to be [illegible] still further Left.

[illegible]

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SECRET

[illegible] that the United States wants to restore, not the Republic [illegible] *Front Populaire*, but the Republic of Poincaré, the Comité des [illegible] and [illegible] *Banque Worms*--if not worse.

[illegible] have become again Jacobins in spirit, *révolutionnaires*.

"[illegible] you Americans can't understand us," said Philip some weeks [illegible] certainly *La Marseillaise*, the official organ of the Fighting [illegible], is a journal with the stamp of the revolutionary upon it. [illegible]

far to the Left. [illegible]

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A [illegible] left-wing element in Fighting France consists of Christian Socialists. Mostly disciples of Maritain, they are not among the leaders of the movement, but at the level just below the top they wield a certain influence. They take both their socialism and their Christianity seriously, and they do not like what they believe to be the policy of the American State Department.

[illegible] and the United States

In fact, within the inner circle of Fighting France, people of all shades of political opinion have expressed strong anti-American sentiments. Among professional naval officers, especially the younger [illegible], this feeling appears to be particularly [illegible]. [illegible], however, is evidently less anti-American than the [illegible] -- since he believes we have a Jeffersonian backlog of [illegible] that [illegible] lead us back to what he regards as the right [illegible].

[illegible] of these sentiments are obvious, and go far to [illegible] behavior at Algiers. With Fighting France, a conviction of [illegible] has always been close [illegible]. De Gaulle has [illegible] Joan of Arc to [illegible].

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Free French 9066
X Cameroun, message [illegible]

November 11, 1942

[illegible] President
[illegible] House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

The following two messages were received through our representative in Duala, Cameroun, French Equatorial Africa, with the request that they be transmitted to you.

"Tous les francais du Cameroun ont appris avec [illegible] la nouvelle du debarquement en Afrique du Nord des troupes americaines. Ils sont persuades que cette operation a ete decidee en plein accord avec le General de Gaulle et le Comite National Francais. Ils ont entendu avec emotion l'appel du General Giraud aux francais de l'Afrique du Nord. Ils sont convaincus que cet appel sera entendu. La France Combattante, qui n'a cesse de lutter depuis les armistices, voit sa force [illegible]. Bientot par la victoire et avec l'aide des [illegible], elle liberera le sol [illegible]. Elle rendra a la France sa place dans le monde."

[illegible], Gouverneur du Cameroun Francais

"[illegible] plus que jamais derriere le chef le General de Gaulle, les [illegible] Combattants du Cameroun ont appris avec une joie [illegible] [illegible] en Afrique du Nord. Car c'est le [illegible] que le General de Gaulle avait [illegible] [illegible] de tout l'Empire francais [illegible]."

Colonel [illegible], Commanding Officer
of Free French Forces in Cameroun

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMSEL

DATE: OCTOBER 13 1942

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN

SUBJECT:

As of possible interest, I am advised at the Department of State that they have approved in principle the recruiting by the Free French of Americans for their forces and services. Only such Americans who are not subject to draft in this country are permitted to accept. Passports are being issued to them.

W. A. K.

cc: Major Bruce

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM for Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM: O.S.S. Supporting Committee

The Committee has learned from a very reliable source that Monsieur Andre Philip has arrived in Washington on an important political mission for General de Gaulle. It is stated further that he bears a letter from Leon Blum to Président Roosevelt. It is alleged that this letter speaks not only in the name of Blum but in those of Herriot and Marin as well, and urges the necessity of "Union Nationale" and full diplomatic recognition of General de Gaulle as Chief of State.

The Committee understands further that in Andre Philip's diplomatic offensive he will probably proffer important military and psychological warfare collaboration on the part of the Fighting French in return for extensive political concessions.

It is the consensus of the Committee that it might be well for the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- perhaps through Admiral Leahy -- to be acquainted with the foregoing information so that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could anticipate the linking of high matters of political policy with matters having to do with the military conduct of the war.

It might be a timely moment to let the Joint Chiefs of Staff know that O.S.S. could be of assistance in compiling comprehensive information on all aspects of the Free French Movement as background for any decision which they might have to reach.

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Fighting French 10,968
< Massigli
< de Gaulle
< Alfreda M.
< Kittredge, T.B.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: April 1, 1943

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT:

In your memorandum of March 23rd you inquired with regard to "the truth about cables #15181 and 15182". These two cables were prepared, not by SI, but by Research and Analysis in London. They seemed to be in complete accord with other such information which we have ourselves and have accumulated over a period of time and in particular, they agreed with a memorandum written by Lt. Com. Kittredge (O.N.I. London), copy of which was given to our London office and has arrived here.

The similarity in spots between the R. and A. cables mentioned above and Commander Kittredge's memorandum indicates attached that R. and A. had access to it and followed its outlines and estimations in many respects.

Lt. Com. Kittredge is known to me and known to our London people. He is an Aide to Admiral Stark who is representative of the United States Government to General DeGaulle. Kittredge has devoted almost twelve months now exclusively to Free French affairs, acting with Admiral Stark, often as his deputy. I rate his opinion on such matters very high indeed and know that he is in touch not only with our SI branch, but with R. and A. as well.

W.H.S.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360007-8

Fighting French 10,968
x [illegible]
x De Gaulle
x Africa N.
x Kittredge, T.B.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: March 18, 1943

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: Richard Southgate

SUBJECT: SI File #A-3256

There are attached two memoranda which we have received from our London office. These documents, which deal with personalities involved in the problem of the Unification of the French in the War Effort were prepared by Lieut. Commander Kittredge for Admiral Stark and made available to us by Lieut. Col. Butler.

R.S.

Richard Southgate

Attachments (2)

cc: [illegible] Magruder, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Hughes, Dr. Rogers.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

A 3256

February 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM for Admiral Stark.

Subject: Position and attitude of Mr. Rene Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French National Committee.

1. Mr. Massigli called on you on February 12 to acquaint you with his attitude on current problems of organization of the French effort in the war against the Axis. He explained:

(a) that he had only recently left France (January 27);

(b) that he had not previously known de Gaulle but had joined Fighting France as "Gaullism" is identified in France with resistance to the Germans;

(c) that he had not expected to accept any appointment but had yielded to pressure to assume direction of the Foreign Relations of the French National Committee;

(d) that his only object was to achieve union of all French activities in the war against the Axis, as quickly as possible.

(e) that he would not remain in his present office if opposition from other Fighting French circles made impossible complete agreement and union with General Giraud and the French in North Africa.

2. Mr. Massigli had made similar statements on February 10 to the Prime Minister. Mr. Peake showed [illegible] on February 12 a note made by Major Desmond Morton on Massigli's interview with Mr. Churchill. This note had the following points:

(a) The Prime Minister stated that [illegible] "fed-up" with de Gaulle and would not in the future confer [illegible] with him.

(b) The Prime Minister also indicated [illegible] H.M. Government was not disposed to tolerate [illegible] obstruction by de Gaulle and the National Committee [illegible] unification of French participation in the United Nations war effort.

(c) Mr. Massigli was informed that [illegible] in complete agreement with [illegible] of establishing [illegible] under the National [illegible] French forces and [illegible] and the War Committee of [illegible] in North and West Africa.

[illegible]

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(d) Mr. Massigli expressed his complete agreement with Mr. Churchill's views and indicated that he had accepted appointment as Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in order to achieve such an effective union with the French in North and West Africa.

5. Mr. Massigli referred in conversation to his recent activities. After serving for some years as Director of Political Affairs in the Inde d'Orsay he was appointed Ambassador to Turkey and was in this position in June 1940. He had refused to accept the armistice or to agree to Vichy collaborationist policies. He had therefore resigned his position and returned to France where he had lived quietly on the French Riviera. In November 1942 he went into hiding to avoid arrest by the Gestapo when the Germans occupied all of France. He was smuggled out of France after two months.

4. Massigli is highly esteemed by British and American diplomats who have known him for many years (Mr. Eden and Mr. Strong of the Foreign Office, Ambassador Biddle, Mr. Pinckney Tuck, and Mr. Freeman Matthews of the U.S.Diplomatic Service.) His appointment to replace Pleven as Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French National Committee was made with the full support of the military leaders of Fighting France, such as General Catroux, General d'Astier, Admiral d'Argenlieu and Admiral Auboyneau. They had urged de Gaulle to reach agreement with Giraud as quickly as possible without demanding prior guarantees or pledges from Giraud. Certain of the civilian Commissioners, such as Pleven, Philip, Diethelm and Cassin, had urged de Gaulle to insist on such guarantees which would have the effect of subordinating Giraud and the French leaders in Africa to de Gaulle and the National Committee. After the meeting at Casablanca, Catroux and the military leaders urged de Gaulle to arrange immediately for the exchange of liaison missions between Algiers and London that had been agreed upon by de Gaulle and Giraud. This view was finally accepted on February 4 by de Gaulle. General Catroux was sent to Algiers on February 6th, and Massigli assumed the direction of Foreign Relations on February 8.

T.B. KITTREDGE,
Lieut-Commander, U.S.N.R.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

A 3256

February 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM for Admiral Stark.

Subject: Unification of French in the War: Views and Policies of the French National Committee and General de Gaulle.

1. Negotiations between Generals Catroux and Giraud at Algiers (February 8-12) following the meetings of de Gaulle and Giraud at Casablanca (January 21-24) would appear to have resulted in agreement on an exchange of missions between London and Algiers. This agreement applies to the personnel of the two missions and to the methods to be followed in establishing immediate liaison and collaboration between de Gaulle and the French National Committee in London, and Giraud and the War Committee in North Africa. The hope is expressed on both sides that this practical collaboration may lead, within a few months, to increasingly closer cooperation, and a complete fusion of all French war efforts under a single direction.

2. There still remain differences of ultimate political objectives, which involve not only differing policies, but opposing views as to the methods to be used and the personnel to be chosen to direct and administer the war effort and to represent French interests in United Nations discussions. There would appear to be agreement for immediate cooperation and joint action in matters such as -

a) the integration of the various French land, air and sea forces into a single unified French military machine;

b) working out of a joint arrangement with the United Kingdom and the United States for the requirement, reorganization and training of all French forces and for the supply of essential types of armaments by the Allies to the French;

c) the establishment of joint representation in London, Washington, Moscow and other United Nations and neutral countries, of the territories and forces of fighting France and those of the French in North and West Africa;

d) the [illegible] of joint financial and economic programs and policies;

e) the joint maintenance of close contact with the resistance movements in France and with French groups [illegible] and the West Indies, and also [illegible] and the French Squadron now interned in Alexandria, with a view to obtaining complete union of all French in the war for the liberation of France.

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f) the preparation of a central political representation of French interests by the fusion of the existing committees now functioning in London and in Algiers.

3. The attitude and policies inspiring the decisions of General de Gaulle and the French National Committee as to relations with General Giraud and the French Administration in North and West Africa are influenced by: -

a) definite theories and positive convictions as to the position of France since 1940;

b) well defined policies with reference to French activities and relations with Allied Powers;

c) suspicion of Allied purposes due to lack of information as to Allied policies, plans and activities;

d) defects and shortcomings in the organization of Fighting France.

In his Press Conference of February 9, 1943, General de Gaulle restated in detail his position and that of the French National Committee.

4. The whole program of Fighting France is based on de Gaulle's broadcast of June 18, 1940, and on definitions of the conditions for French participation in the war later evolved on the bases of theoretical principles and convictions:

a) Repudiation of the armistice with Germany and of recognizing and accepting the defeat of France and the voluntary subordination of France to victorious Germany.

b) Denial of the legitimacy of the Vichy regime of Marshal Petain and of all of the collaborationist and authoritarian programs and acts of this regime.

c) Insistence on the necessity for the maintenance or reestablishment of the republican traditions and [illegible] of France as they existed on June 17, 1940.

d) Guarantees of the right of the French people, after liberation, to decide in free elections the [illegible] of France.

e) Refusal to [illegible] or [illegible] held to share responsibility for the [illegible] and for the policy of collaboration with Germany.

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3. General de Gaulle and the French National Committee have been equally positive in their claims to represent the traditional France and the French people with the Allied Governments and Forces. Although these claims have never been officially recognized by the United States or British Governments, they have been supported and accepted by the Soviet authorities, by the Czech Government in Exile, and by certain other United Nations' Governments. This difference of view as to the role and functions of the "Free French" movement and its leader, General de Gaulle, have existed since the inception of the movement. The following have been the chief illustrations of this divergence:

a) On June 20, 1940, de Gaulle wrote Churchill proposing to create a "French National Committee" (on the model of the Czechoslovak National Committee) which might later be recognized as the de facto Government of France. The British agreed only to the establishment of a central organization for those French willing to join de Gaulle in continuing to fight against the Axis.

b) In October 1940, de Gaulle created a "Council for the Defense of the French Empire" to represent France. He insisted that all French territories liberated from Axis or Vichy control should be brought into this Council. The British did not agree and the Council in fact never held a plenary session.

c) In July 1941, after the British - Free French occupation of Syria, the administration of Syria was to be assumed by a Free French High Commissioner (General Catroux) in collaboration with the British Military Commander in that area and a resident British Minister (General Spears). There have been frequent differences of view between the British and de Gaulle as to the Free French role and functions in Syria.

d) In September 1941, de Gaulle, with British agreement, formed a French National Committee, made up of Commissioners, each functioning as a Minister. While this Committee has been recognized by all the United Nations' Governments as responsible de facto for the administration of Free French territories in Africa and in the Pacific, de Gaulle's claim to represent France and the French Empire has not been recognized by any of the United Nations except the Soviet and Czech Governments.

e) De Gaulle's wish to take over other French territories has never been recognized. The State Department protested in January 1942 against the Free French landing at St. Pierre and Miquelon, but later, tacitly recognized the Free French administration established there after a plebiscite supported de Gaulle's action. Later in 1942 the State Department recognized the Free French as Allies in the war effort, in the Pacific (February 26) and Equatorial Africa (April 4). Through the National Committee in London [illegible] it has consistently refused political recognition as a de facto Government.

f) Similarly, in 1942 the British [illegible] Madagascar (May) and arranged [illegible] over French [illegible] ([illegible]). The administration was confined [illegible]

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to Fighting France commissioners in December 1942, only under British military control.

g) The Allied landing in North Africa (November 7/8, 1942) and the subsequent arrangements with the French authorities in North and West Africa were made without the prior knowledge or consent of General de Gaulle and the French National Committee.

h) De Gaulle has made a series of broadcasts since November 1941 insisting that Fighting France is the representative of the anti-German and anti-Vichy sentiments of the vast majority of the population of France. He has claimed that only Fighting France has the necessary support and mandate to assume responsibility for representing France in the war for liberation and for the restoration of French liberties and republican institutions. General Giraud and the War Committee in North Africa, in agreement with the United States and British Governments, refuses to recognize this claim or to subordinate themselves to de Gaulle and the National Committee.

5. The British military authorities after the Dakar incident (September 1940) and the Syrian campaign (1941) refused to associate General de Gaulle and his staff with military plans or operations even when these involved French territories or forces (Madagascar and North Africa in 1942). In spite of a series of proposals by General de Gaulle, as in his memorandum of July 21, 1942, neither the British and United States Chiefs of Staff nor responsible political authorities have been willing to inform de Gaulle of plans or to associate Fighting France with United Nations staffs or operations. This has created an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility toward the United States and Britain, such as has been expressed in a series of broadcasts and statements to the press concerning North African developments.

6. In the accompanying memorandum details are given of the character and composition of the French National Committee. Although de Gaulle's name is looked upon in France as meaning resistance to the Germans, this adherence to Gaullism does not imply acceptance of de Gaulle as a political leader or exponent of a political program. There are very few men of first rate ability in the higher positions of the Fighting French organization. The personnel of the Civilian staff is of widely divergent origin, experience and quality. Much intrigue has developed between different cliques in a struggle for positions and power, which in fact has been essentially a competition for the favor and approval of de Gaulle himself as the acknowledged "Chief".

7. The fact remains, however, that no voice of French in the war would now be capable of satisfactorily without the participation of General de Gaulle and of Fighting France. Moreover responsible French, British and American officers in London have used their influence to bring about an agreement between General Giraud and General Catroux which will achieve that unity of all French engaged in the common war effort. A central

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political authority may become possible only when one of the responsible French political leaders and magistrates of the Republic can take over the direction of the political representation of France. It is understood that some such solution may be reached in the next few months. Pending such a development practical cooperation of existing French leaders, and leaders, such as is envisaged by the de Gaulle-Giraud negotiations, can lay the foundations and prepared the way for united French action.

T.B. KITTREDGE
Lieutenant-Commander, U.S.N.R.

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